Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel by unknown
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
AEROSPACESAFETY
ADVISORYPANEL
ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1998
February 1999
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Code Q-1
NASA Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546
Tel: 202 / 358-0914
ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1998
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19990036703 2020-06-15T22:26:50+00:00Z

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Headquarters
Washington, DC 20546-0001
_eply to Attn of: Q-1
Honorable Daniel S. Goldin
Administrator
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC 20546
February1999
Dear Mr. Goldin:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is pleased to submit its annual report for 1998.
Excellent relations between the Panel and NASA and its contractors characterized the past year. We saw
exceptional safety consciousness wherever we went. The experience level and technical expertise of the
government and private workforce remains impressive. Safety in the short term is well served.
The long-term picture is less certain. NASA's success depends heavily on the quality of its workforce.
Unfortunately, much of the present workforce is nearing the end of its career, and there appears to be insuf-
ficient succession planning. Tight budgets have forced severe limitations on hiring. It is unclear how the
expertise will be developed to continue existing programs safely and effectively guide new efforts.
Budget and external constraints have also forced a short planning horizon with respect to upgrades for the
Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS). Even though both programs are presently operat-
ing at an acceptable level of risk, there are identified improvements that could make them even safer.
When these efforts are delayed, a valuable risk reduction opportunity is lost.
NASA must also acknowledge the continuing, vital role of the Space Shuttle until well into the next cen-
tury and develop plans accordingly. The reliance of the ISS on the Space Shuttle must be taken into
account when considering its replacement with any new, human-rated Reusable Launch Vehicle.
Sincerely,
Richard D. Blomberg
Chair
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
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his report covers the activities of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
(ASAP) for calendar year 1998--a year of sharp contrasts and significant
successes at NASA. The year opened with the nnouncem nt of large work-
force cutbacks. The slip in the schedule for launching the International
Space Station (ISS) created a 5-month hiatus in Space Shuttle launches. This slack
period ended with the successful and highly publicized launch of the STS-95 mission.
As the year closed, ISS assembly began with the successful orbiting and joining of the
Functional Cargo Block (FGB), Zarya, from Russia and the Unity Node from the
United States.
Throughout the year, the Panel maintained its scrutiny of NASA's safety processes.
Of particular interest were the potential effects on safety of workforce reductions and
the continued transition of functions to the Space Flight Operations Contractor.
Attention was also given to the risk management plans of the Aero-Space
Technology programs, including the X-33, X-34, and X-38. Overall, the Panel con-
cluded that safety is well served for the present.
The picture is not as clear for the future. Cutbacks have limited the depth of talent
available. In many cases, technical specialties are "one deep." The extended hiring
freeze has resulted in an older workforce that will inevitably suffer significant depar-
tures from retirements in the near future. The resulting "brain drain" could represent
a future safety risk unless appropriate succession planning is started expeditiously.
This and other topics are covered in the section addressing workforce.
The major NASA programs are also limited in their ability to plan properly for the
future. This is of particular concern for the Space Shuttle and ISS because these pro-
grams are scheduled to operate well into the next century. In the case of the Space
Shuttle, beneficial and mandatory safety and operational upgrades are being delayed
because of a lack of sufficient present funding. Likewise, the ISS has little flexibility
to begin long lead-time items for upgrades or contingency planning. For example, the
section on computer hardware and software contains specific findings related to
required longer range safety-related actions.
NASA can be proud of its accomplishments this past year, but must remain ever vig-
ilant, particularly as ISS assembly begins to accelerate. The Panel will continue to
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focus on both the short- and long-term a: pects of risk management and safety plan-
ning. This task continues to be made m_ nageable and productive by the excellent
cooperation the Panel receives from bo:h NASA and its contractors. Particular
emphasis will continue to be directed to lcnger term workforce and program planning
issues as well as the immediate risks associated with ISS assembly and the initial
flights of the X-33 and X-34.
Section 11of this report presents specific findings and recommendations generated by
ASAP activities during 1998. Section 1II :ontains more detailed information in sup-
port of these findings and recommendatio as. Appendix A is a current roster of Panel
members, consultants, and staff. Appendi _ B contains NASA's response to the find-
ings and recommendations from the 1997 &SAP Annual Report. Appendix C details
the fact-finding activities of the Panel in 1998.
During the year, Mr. Richard D. Blombetg was elected chair of the Panel and Vice
Admiral (VADM) Robert E Dunn was elected deputy chair. VADM Bernard M.
Kauderer moved from consultant to member. Mr. Charles J. Donlan retired from
the Panel after many years of meritorious service. Ms. Shirley C. McCarty and
Mr. Robert L. ("Hoot") Gibson joined O e Panel as consultants.
_i,__!/_ !_ii_ii_i7i17_ii'......__' _i_
II. F gs-a 
Recommendations
A. WORKFORCE
Safety is ultimately the responsibility of the crews, engineers, scientists, and techni-
cians who, in collaboration with private-sector contractors, design, build, and
operate NASA's space and aeronautical systems. The competency, training, and
motivation of the workforce are just as essential to safe operations as is well-designed,
well-maintained, and properly operated hardware. NASA has traditionally recog-
nized this key linkage between people and safety by viewing its employees as "assets,
not costs" and by sustaining highly innovative human resources initiatives to
strengthen the NASA workforce.
In recent years, a declining real budget has forced a significant downsizing of NASA
personnel who manage, design, and process the Space Shuttle and the International
Space Station (ISS) programs, especially at the Centers associated with human space
flight: Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Johnson Space Center (JSC), and Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC). To avoid a highly disruptive mandatory reduction-in-
force (RIF), NASA has encouraged voluntary resignations through a limited
"buyout" program, normal attrition, and a hiring freeze. This combination of ele-
ments has been effective in avoiding an involuntary RIF, but it has not been able to
avoid the consequential shortages in critical skills and expertise in some disciplines
and capabilities. The transition of responsibilities from NASA to the United Space
Alliance (USA) under the Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOC) has further
affected the mix of duties and capabilities that are available to conduct NASA's day-
to-day business associated with the Space Shuttle and the ISS.
The problem is not limited to the Government workforce. Similar shortages of crit-
ical skills resulting from the downsizing at USA have been noted in the NASA USA
Transition and Downsizing Review: Ground and Flight Operations, the Lang/Abner
report of May 1998.
Because KSC, JSC, and MSFC each face additional downsizing targets of 300 to
400 positions by fiscal year (FY) 2000, the potential for additional shortfalls in key
competencies clearly exists. Among other effects, the hiring freeze of the past several
years has all but killed the usual pattern of bringing "new blood" into the Agency to
replace those who are leaving through retirements, attrition, or voluntary
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resignations. Although the hiring freeze has now been lifted, budgetary restrictions
make it all but impossible to replace experienced persons who are leaving. In these
circumstances, the question of who wil be available and fully qualified to lead
NASA's human space flight programs in the post-2005 period has become real. In the
shorter run, there are unanswered questk.ns as to whether the combined workforce
of NASA and USA will be sufficient to sapport an increased flight rate in the post-
1999 period. This issue is also addressed iq the Space Shuttle section of this report.
During this period, NASA has found it difficult to sustain its reputation as an agency
that attracts and retains "the best and the brightest" among Federal employees.
Recapturing this tradition will be an im t ortant factor in NASA's ability to sustain
safe and successful future missions, as well as the vision required to sustain this coun-
try's leadership in space flight and aero-sl: ace technology.
Finding #1
Budget and personnel ceiling constraints on the hiring of engineers, scientists, and
technical workers are moving NASA tow _rd a crisis of losing the core competencies
needed to conduct the Nation's space flight and aerospace programs in a safe and
effective manner.
Recommendation #1
Provide NASA's human space flight Field Centers, particularly KSC, JSC, and
MSFC, with the budgetary resources .rod administrative flexibility needed to
strengthen their human resource capabili 'ies.
Finding #2
Shortfalls in workforce training within both NASA and USA, caused by downsizing
and the related difficulty of hiring new l:eople to fill skill shortages, can jeopardize
otherwise safe operations.
Recommendation #2
NASA and USA should review critical s_ ills training and certification requirements
and institute programs to ensure the full l_roficiency of the workforce and the safety
of the products being released.
Finding #3
The combined effect of workforce downsizing, the recent hiring freeze, and the
SF©C transition, especially at KSC, has raised the possibility that NASA senior
managers in the future will lack the necessary hands-on technical knowledge and in-
line experience to provide effective insight of operations.
Recommendation #3
NASA should develop and promulgate training and career paths, with a special focus
on providing hands-on technical knowledge and experience, so that NASA's future
senior managers will possess the range of skills and experience required for effective
insight of the SFOC.
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B. SPACESHUTTLEPROGRAM
Despite continuing long-term uncertainti_ s, the Space Shuttle system worked well in
1998. The program took advantage of a reduced Space Shuttle flight rate to begin
needed work on organization, infrastructure, and paperwork. Much remains to be done,
however. In particular, with regard to the contractor workforce numbers and quality,
there are no clear plans for accommodating an increased flight rate. This is a critical
problem, which is treated in more detail in the "Workforce" section of this report. Also
treated in the "Workforce" section but wcrthy of special note herein are two circum-
stances that particularly affect the KSC w 3rkforce: the uncertainty of the manifest as
managers wrestle with the ISS requirements and the long-term future of the Space
Shuttle program as top management and politicians frame the future in terms of a
Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV). This, despite the fact that the Space Shuttle is essen-
tial for the ISS and given the recent history of new-start acquisition programs, will
probably be the first-line human space vel" icle until well into the next century.
Problems also exist because of the outmoded and limited computer hardware and
software capabilities of the orbiter. Findings and recommendations related thereto
are in the "Computer Hardware/Software" section of this report. There are also prob-
lems looming in the area of logistics; insafficient spares, workforce reductions, and
the tenuous status of vendors for the program give pause for concern. On the other
hand, the current systems, facilities, anc personal dedication and morale of those
who are involved with the Space Shuttle on a day-to-day basis are not in question.
In fact, the dedication of both Government and contractor personnel is of the high-
est order. In addition, there is a well-estabLished program of continuous improvement
and continuous examination of critical processes throughout the system. Finally,
there remain in place numerous interlo{king processes, checks and balances, and
individual knowledge, which will serve tc, stop work whenever the unusual arises or
uncertainty prevails. In spite of the generally positive present conditions, the follow-
ing findings and recommendations are re'evant.
Finding #4
It is often difficult to find meaningful metrics that directly show safety risks or unsafe
conditions. Safety risks for a mature vehi_:le, such as the Space Shuttle, are identifi-
able primarily in specific deviations from established procedures and processes, and
they are meaningful only on a case-by-ca.,e basis. NASA and USA have a procedure
for finding and reporting mishaps and "cl _se calls" that should produce far more sig-
nificant insight into safety risks than wotld mere metrics.
Recommendation #4
In addition to standard metrics, NASA ;hould be intimately aware of the mishaps
and close calls that are discovered, follo_ up in a timely manner, and concur on the
recommended corrective actions.
Finding #5
A principal cause of Space Shuttle processing errors is incorrect documentation
("paperwork").
Recommendation #5
NASA and USA must place increased priority on determining error sources, causes,
and corrective actions for inadequacies in the documentation on which Space
Shuttle processing is based and develop a management system that drastically reduces
the time that it takes to incorporate paperwork changes.
Finding #6
While spares support of the Space Shuttle fleet has been generally satisfactory, repair
turnaround times (RTAT's) have shown indications of rising. Increased flight rates
will exacerbate this problem.
Recommendat/on #6
Refocus on adequate acquisition of spares and logistic system staffing levels to pre-
clude high RTAT's, which contribute to poor reliability and could lead to a mishap.
Finding #7
NASA aircraft used for both Space Shuttle operations and astronaut training are
increasingly out of date and, in several respects, may be approaching the unsafe. This is
noticeably so in the case of the Shuttle Training Aircraft (STA) and the T-38 aircraft.
Recommendation #7
Continue to execute and accelerate as much as possible the current plans for the
modernization and safety assessment of astronaut training aircraft.
Finding #8
The use of simulated Space Shuttle launch and flight operations for training and
rehearsal has proven to be an effective technique for enhancing safety and efficiency
and is especially valuable in the case of special or rarely performed procedures or after
a long hiatus of effort.
Recommendation #8
Simulation-based training should be included in difficult or infrequent Space Shuttle
operations whenever feasible. This type of training is especially needed after there
has been a significant hiatus in performing an operation.
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C. INTI]INATIONALSPACESTATIONPROGRAM
With the launch of the first two elements of the International Space Station, the
program has entered the launch and integration phase. When, late in 1997, the
launch schedules were changed to accomr_odate late deliveries of various elements,
the ISS program took advantage of the delay to introduce Multi-Element Integrated
Testing (MELT}. Subsequently, the Panel participated in an assessment of the total
planned ISS test program. This test program was found to be satisfactory. The inclu-
sion of MElT provides for testing at a h gher level of integration than had been
previously available.
During the year, the lSS caution and warning system effort was expanded to include
the beginnings of a true damage assessmet:t and control component. The Panel will
continue to monitor progress in this area as well as plans for ISS protection from
micrometeoroids and orbital debris.
Closely related to the ISS is the subject of extravehicular activity (EVA), which has
acquired greater importance during the ISS construction phase. It is covered in a sub-
sequent sectton of this report.
Finding #9
Some hardware is being used in MEIT before it has completed qualification testing.
Software is also often used before its verification and validation is complete. In both
cases, modification to the hardware or soft ware may be required before certification
is completed, thereby potentially invalidat ng the results of the initial MEIT testing.
Recommendation #9
When it makes sense to deliver hardware ,)r software to system-level testing such as
MEIT before., qualification/certification is :omplete, the effect of any qualification-
induced changes must be carefully evaluated for implications for regression testing.
Final testing should always be run with validated software and qualified hardware.
Finding # 10
MEIT is the highest level of integrated tes:ing available before committing ISS ele-
ments to launch. To produce valid results, _his testing requires a high level of fidelity
in emulators/simulators used in place of missing components.
Recommendation #10
The ISS program should ensure that higl.-fidelity simulations of on-orbit compo-
nents are used in the MEIT and that the configurations of those simulators are
validated to be in agreement with what ha; actually been orbited.
Finding # 11
Astronaut crew participation in testing improves fidelity of the test and better famil-
iarizes the crew with systems and procedures.
Recommendation # 11
NASA should continue to involve the crew in integration testing and do so more
heavily and at an earlier stage.
Finding #12
The current ISS requirement is for a single Crew Return Vehicle (CRV). Crew safety
over the life of the ISS requires the availability on orbit of two CRV's, each of which
is capable of accommodating the entire crew. The Soyuz capsule, designated as the
interim CRV, does not have a full crew capability. Also, it is uncertain that sufficient
Soyuz capsules and their launchers will be available to supply the needs of the ISS.
Recommendation #12
NASA should accelerate its program to develop and deploy two full-crew CRV's and
take whatever measures are necessary now to ensure the availability of sufficient
Soyuz capsules and launchers until the CRV's are ready.
Finding # 13
Plans calling for availability on orbit in early 2003 of a U.S. CRV based on the X-38
technology demonstrator are highly ambitious. Although much of the X-38 technol-
ogy is off the shelf, there are numerous features that rely on yet-unproven approaches.
Recommendation #13
NASA must not allow the limited CRV development time to compromise the con-
duct of a thorough risk assessment and testing program.
Finding # 14
In the ASAP Annual Report for 1997, the Panel expressed concern for the high
doses of radiation recorded by U.S. astronauts during extended Phase I missions in
Mir. Subsequent and continuing review of this potential problem revalidates that
unresolved concern. The current NASA limit for radiation exposure is 40 REM per
year to the blood-forming organs, twice the limit for U.S. airline pilots and four times
the limit for Navy nuclear operators (see also Finding #23).
Recommendation #14
NASA should reduce the annual limit for radiation exposure to the blood-forming
organs by at least one half to not more than 20 REM.
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By virtue of the several ongoing programs f,_r the human exploration of space, NASA
is pioneering the study of radiation exposl,re in space and its effects on the human
body. Research that could develop and e_.pand credible knowledge in this field of
unknowns is not keeping pace with operat onal progress.
Recommendation #15
Provide the resources to support more comt letely research in radiation health physics.
Finding # 16
Many deployable structures on the ISS anc satellites on which astronauts must work
during EVA's use pyrotechnic initiators. There is often no simple way for an EVA
astronaut to know by visual inspection whether or not an initiator has fired when a
structure has failed to deploy properly.
Recommendation #16
NASA should develop and require the use of pyrotechnic initiators that leave clear
visual evidence that they have fired. These "fire-evident" initiators should be
required for all applications that may be er countered by an EVA astronaut.
Finding #17
In the event that a primary crewmember is unable to fly on an assigned ISS mission,
current plans call for substituting a cre'vmember from a backup crew. Backup
crewmembers do not, however, train extendvely with the primary crew.
Recommendation #17
If backup crewmembers are to be substituted individually to the primary crew, then
those crews should conduct some meanin_ul degree of joint training.
D. EXTRAVil]IICULARCTIVITY(EVA)
The intense period of EVA required for the on-orbit assembly and maintenance of
the ISS focuses attention on the readiness of the total system, the astronauts and
their support teams, and their unique equipment to perform safely and efficiently
those arduous, complex, and potentially dangerous operations. The EVA Project
Office is to be commended for the foresight to initiate early on the very constructive
planning and training now in progress. This planning effort includes experienced
astronauts, element contractors, and representatives of the program centers. The suc-
cess of the very first EVA's by the crew of Endeavour to mate Unity to Zarya is a
testament to the quality of that planning and training. For example, in an effort to
minimize the possibility for surprises on orbit, the specific tools and some 4,000 end
items with which those tools must work were evaluated underwater in the Neutral
Buoyancy Laboratory.
The Panel finds, however, a number of deficiencies in EVA material, training, and
policy that have the potential to disrupt the orderly process manifested over the next
several years. There is a critical shortage of Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU's).
The current inventory is very success oriented and does not allow for contingencies,
such as damage to a suit on orbit. A similar shortfall exists in Simplified Aid for EVA
Rescue (SAFER) flight units, both U.S. and Russian.
The research and development of improvements to EVA assets has been severely cur-
tailed. Twenty-year-old technology in the current assets continues to stagnate. There
is a need to design a spacesuit for the Mars mission as interest in that venture blos-
soms. Improvements in radiation shielding on EMU's are needed to protect
astronauts during EVA without affecting their ability to perform assigned tasks.
Finally, differences between U.S. and Russian training methods and operational poli-
cies exist and must be resolved as soon as possible.
In summary, the success of EVA will be crucial over the next several years. Resources
should be made available now to correct deficiencies that might affect that success.
Finding # 18
The EVA project lacks sufficient operational assets to meet unplanned contingen-
cies. There are no spare Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMU's). Only five U.S.
Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue (SAFER) flight units will be available to meet a
requirement to maintain three units on orbit. In addition, only four Russian SAFER
units are planned.
Recommendation #18
To meet contingencies that are almost certain to arise, additional EMU's_and SAFER
units or their critical long lead components should be procured as soon as possible.
ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1998
17
AEROSPACE SAFETY
ADVISORY PANEL
18
Finding #19
The three available sizes of EMU planar Hard Upper Torso (HUT) units will accom-
modate crewmembers from the 40th perct:ntile female to the 95th percentile male.
Assumptions were made regarding the abi ity of crewmembers to upsize or downsize
to fit the three available HUT sizes and operate safely and effectively in them.
Recommendation #19
To validate the ability of crewmembers to, actually use the various available HUT
sizes, crewmembers in each of the several s.ze combinations/configurations should be
required to perform normal and emergenc,_ functions in training mockups to demon-
strate that full capability is available to ea,:h.
Finding #20
The EVA Research and Technology (R&'I) program has been highly successful, and
its products have led to the development of significant safety and operational
improvements to EVA hardware and proce lures. Current funding for advanced R&T
for EVA is extremely limited.
Recommendation #20
Restore the EVA R&T program to a leve that will permit further development of
not only near-term safety and operability iiaprovements but also long-term products.
Finding #21
The safety implications of EVA training for U.S. and international partner astronauts
in the Russian Hydrolab are not well und,:rstood. In particular, the implications of
higher suit pressures and Russian bends pro ocols have not been thoroughly analyzed.
Recommendation #21
NASA should study the procedures used ir the Russian Hydrolab to determine their
safety and monitor all Hydrolab testing when U.S. astronauts are involved.
Finding #22
There is an initiative to modify the prebre_the protocol for EVA operations on the
ISS. The target is a 2-hour prebreathe fr¢ m any pressure with the same or better
bends risk than the protocol currently used in Space Shuttle operations.
Recommendation #22
Prior to authorizing any reduction in prebre ithe protocol for EVA on the ISS, NASA
should conduct a study to ensure that there is no increase in the risk of bends asso-
ciated with the special circumstances of the proposed new protocol.
Finding #23
The greatest potential for overexposure of the crew to ionizing radiation exists during
EVA operations. Furthermore, the magnitude of any overexposure cannot be pre-
dicted using current models.
Recommendation #23
NASA should determine the most effective method of increasing EMU shielding with-
out adversely affecting operability and then implement that shielding for the EMU's.
Finding #24
EVA ground rule 4.3.2.12, "No Simultaneous EMU/Orlan ISS Extravehicular
Activity," is constraining and reduces flexibility.
Recommendation #24
NASA should reexamine this ground rule and consider a criterion for selecting either
an EMU or the Orlan suit for a particular EVA based on the specific requirements of
the EVA or the specific crewmembers performing the EVA.
Finding #25
The NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) on a SAFER unit tested on STS-86 on October
1, 1997, did not activate because of a marginal design of the activating power supply.
As a result, the unit could not function. The certification testing for the firing cir-
cuit did not identify the power supply inadequacy. Also, an inadequate NSI emulator
was used for most of the original SAFER certification (qualification) and acceptance
tests (see also Finding #14).
Recommendation #25a
The design and implementation of flight systems critical to safety and mission suc-
cess should, at least, provide redundancy for system startup.
Recommendation #25b
All NASA Centers should review the design requirements for reliable activation of
the NSI and assure they are adequate to be communicated to their suppliers, espe-
cially those who are responsible for the design of firing circuits. All designs currently
using NSI's should be reviewed to assure that the firing circuits are adequate and have
been appropriately tested.
Recommendation #25c
Qualification tests of safety-critical equipment must use flight-quality hardware. Any
exceptions must require high-level program approval.
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NASA's Aero-Space Technology Enterpri;e activities continue to be impressive. As
befits the Nation's premier aeronautics crganization, the NASA aeronautics Field
Centers, guided by the vision of the Three Pillarsfor Success Straterg_cPlan, lead the way
in identifying enhancements for greater fight safety in all environments. Likewise,
those same Centers continue to make major contributions to aviation and space trans-
portation technology and stimulate other:_ to do the same. Especially noteworthy is
the pervasive evidence of enthusiastic dedication to safety on the part of every indi-
vidual, even as development and testing e:cplore the outer reaches of the unknown.
Key to that dedication to safety is involw :d leadership at all levels. That leadership
is committed to and backed up by ou:standing training and solid procedures.
Principal among the latter are those set fi_rth in the Annual Operating Agreement
between each Center and the Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.
Significantly, at aeronautics Centers from which research aircraft are flown, there is
a strong and viable Airworthiness and Flight Safety Review Board (AFSRB) process,
including the involvement of top manager _ent as the ultimate authority. Those same
Centers are wholeheartedly committed to a strong Flight Readiness Review process
as a final preflight safety check.
In addition to the impressive current fligh: safety approaches described above, many
other ongoing efforts will also serve to enhance aviation safety if pursued to their
conclusion. Among them are integrated vehicle health management, intelligent
flight controls, winter runway friction research, synthetic vision, tile research, and
the various flight research programs.
As impressive as the Aero-Space Technology Enterprise is, there are some issues
worthy of reflection. Among them i; the need for the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) to play a greater role in the pursuit of the safety goals embed-
ded in NASA's Three Pillars. An encore aging step in this direction is the recent
signing of a memorandum of understandir g between the FAA and NASA. In addi-
tion, both the X-33 and X-34 programs a:e quite ambitious and have the potential
for safety problems if ambition is not temp__red with appropriate analysis and testing.
Finally, while other agencies, often the U. 3. Air Force, have responsibility for range
safety when new vehicles are tested, NASA oversight of planning and procedures for
such testing is essential. That responsibilit _,cannot be abdicated.
Finding #26
Achieving the objectives of the first of NASA's Three Pillars, Global Civil Aviation,
requires greater involvement and support by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).
Recommendation #26
NASA should pursue further commitment from the FAA to participate in the first
of NASA's Three Pillars, Global Civil Aviation.
Finding #27
The X-34 technology demonstrator program faces safety risks related to the vehicle's
separation f,om the L-1011 carrier aircraft and to the validation of flight software.
Moreover, safety functions seem to be distributed among the numerous contractors,
subcontractors, and NASA without a clear definition of roles and responsibilities.
Recommendat/on #2 7
NASA should review and assure that adequate attention is focused on the potentially
dangerous flight separation maneuver, the thorough and proper validation of flight
software, and the pinpointing and integration of safety responsibilities in the X-34
program.
Finding #28
Because X-33 and X-34 flight range safety is the responsibility of another agency,
NASA may have a tendency to pay less attention to that aspect of the programs.
Recommendation #28
When NASA-sponsored vehicles are using a test range, NASA should not abdicate
its responsibilities to ensure safe flight.
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Computer systems continue to play an :ncreasingly safety-critical role in NASA's
activities. They also represent areas of potential risk to major programs. Because of
the vital importance of computer hardware and software to NASA's activities, the
Panel has continued its practice of including a separate section on this topic.
During this past year, the Panel has observed substantial progress related to computer
hardware and software. The International Space Station program has instituted a
schedule review activity that should prcvide an early warning of specific areas in
which software development and test schedules are in danger. The ISS has also
improved its software configuration mana ;ement and is making deliveries of certified
flight software. The new Checkout and launch Control System (CLCS) at KSC is
making good progress and promises to be a significant improvement over the exist-
ing Launch Processing System (LPS). In :ddition, the Independent Verification and
Validation (IV&V) facility in Fairmont, West Virginia, has made excellent strides in
defining its mission and has shown substantial progress.
Nevertheless, there are still a number of ¢oncerns for which action is needed. These
are covered by the findings and recomme ldations presented below.
Finding #29
The Space Shuttle General Purpose Computers (GPC's) are outmoded and limit the
ability to incorporate necessary software changes and hardware upgrades.
Recommendation #29
NASA should begin the process of replaci lg the Space Shuttle GPC's. As part of this
effort, NASA should also modularize the flight software.
Finding #.30
There is no formal requirement that depel dent Space Shuttle I-loads be recalculated
or checked when an l-load patch is to be aplinked.
Recommendation #30
NASA should create a dependency matrix of all I-loads. Furthermore, it should assess
its Space Shuttle and ISS procedures and ensure that they are all fully documented.
Finding #31
Present plans depend on human procedures to achieve lockout to prevent inadver-
tent or unauthorized access to actual hardware when using the new Checkout and
Launch Control System (CLCS).
Recommendation #31
NASA should use a computerized authorization to achieve lockout of commands to
actual hardware from anyone not authorized to issue such a command in CLCS.
Finding #32
NASA does not have a plan in place to deal with the problem of maintaining the
many commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software development tools used in its pro-
grams.
Recommendation #32
NASA should develop a general strategy and provide programwide guidelines for
addressing the maintenance of COTS tools.
Finding #33
The planning process for computer upgrades for the ISS has begun. Several possible
upgrades are being discussed, such as replacing the Mass Memory Unit, upgrading the
processor, upgrading the compiler used, and replacing the Portable Computer
Systems (PCS's).
Recommendation #33
NASA should proceed with the upgrade of ISS computer components expeditiously.
In particular, the replacement of the mass storage device with solid-state memory
should be made as soon as possible.
Finding # 34
Configuration management of ISS software does not include the source code for all
of the elements being developed by the international partners.
Recommendation #34
NASA should strengthen the configuration control for ISS software to include soft-
ware (source code as well as binary) and simulations produced by all international
partners and vendors.
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Finding #35
The ISS presently has no programwide software development standards to manage soft-
ware activities performed by NASA, its c__ntractors, and the international partners.
Recommendation #35
The ISS program should establish prograt _wide standards to aid in specifying, design-
ing, developing, and managing all future ISS software projects. These standards can
be as simple as a set of best practices.
Finding #36
Several software developments are on the critical path for launch and operation of
the ISS. While some software elements have had the early involvement of a multi-
disciplinary team that includes users and operators, many have not. The lack of user
involvement results in increased schedul,. • and safety risk to the program.
Recommendation #36
The ISS program should follow a concur'ent engineering approach to building soft-
ware that involves users and other key discipline specialists early in the software
development process to provide a full range of perspectives and improve the under-
standing of requirements before code is developed.
Finding #37
The recent compromising of the Data Fncryption System (DES) suggests that the
ISS command uplink may not be sufficie atly protected.
Recommendation #37
NASA should engage the National Security Agency to conduct a thorough evalua-
tion of the level of protection provided by the current system and proceed as rapidly
as feasible with its plans for a more secu'e encryption system for the ISS. Potential
vulnerabilities of the ground elements of the system should also be assessed.
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A. WORKFORCE
Ref: Finding #1
In its Workforce Restructuring Plan (February 1998), NASA takes note of the hiring
freeze that "contributes to technical stagnation and organizational atrophy" (page 6).
The plan goes on to point out that NASA "now has more S&Es [scientists and engi-
neers] over the age of 70 than below the age of 25." Other NASA managers have
reported to the Panel that there are twice as many engineers over age 60 than under
30. The plan also reports that "NASA has been forced to virtually shut down its
Cooperative Education Program--formerly one of the largest and most successful in
the government" (page 6). This eliminates one of NASA's major sources of new
engineering talent.
All NASA Centers now have authority to resume external hiring within budgetary
ceilings. This is a positive step in the right direction. However, the shortfall of bud-
getary resources also means that the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Johnson Space
Center (JSC), and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will find it all but impos-
sible to resume the hiring of fresh talent until at least FY 2001. These Office of Space
Flight Centers must continue to downsize their workforces to meet the targets set
forth in the Zero Base Review (ZBR) conducted in 1995 and adjusted downward in
subsequent budget reviews. This will mean an additional loss of 300-400 positions at
each Center beyond the significant downsizing that has already been achieved (rang-
ing between 17 percent and 30 percent of the workforce at each Center). However,
the workload associated with the 1995 downsizing targets has changed significantly
at these Centers (for example, the ZBR estimated that 1,500 persons would be
assigned to the International Space Station (ISS); the actual number is close to
2,500). Responsibilities associated with implementing ISO 9000 standards were also
not included in the ZBR. Thus, the Centers have been hard pressed to reach the
1995 and subsequent workforce targets and have found it difficult to maintain core
skills and expertise.
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NASA has initiated a "Core Capability Assessment" that holds promise for estab-
lishing a more realistic human resources baseline that correlates with the projected
workload at the Office of Space Flight Cer ters. This assessment will be completed in
time to affect the FY 2000 budget process. In the meantime, NASA's workforce
deficit is likely to grow. Although it is theo:etically possible to fill a documented crit-
ical skills shortage, the Panel has found this is rarely done because of concomitant
constraints on budget and personnel positions. As a consequence, managers are
prone to "make-do" with a particular skill: deficit or to look for a current employee
who can be transferred or retrained. In son.e cases, this is an acceptable solution, but
often the retraining cannot be accomplished in a satisfactory timeframe. The Panel
is especially concerned that the normal pa_ terns of bringing new technical and man-
agerial leadership into NASA have beer seriously disrupted. Where it has been
established practice to hire at least a few _ozen or so co-op students at each Center
along with other outstanding "fresh-out" engineering graduates, these traditional
channels of identifying NASA's next generation of leaders have all but closed down.
The proper response to the growing workforce crisis within NASA is not wholesale
hiring but, rather, a steady accumulation of younger talent with critical skills and
leadership potential in some reasonable relationship to the losses taking place
through retirements and attrition. There a "e highly professional and creative human
resources managers throughout NASA w m, if given an opportunity, can develop
innovative strategies for strengthening Nf.SA's professional workforce.
Ref: Finding #2
The strategy of retraining and cross-training personnel to fill vacant positions caused
by downsizing makes sense if there are suff cient resources and time to achieve certi-
fied competency of the retrained or cr)ss-trained workers. There is evidence,
however, that the combination of down.,izing and transitioning duties under the
Space Flight Operations Contract (SFOCI has resulted, in some cases, in less than
satisfactory results. As noted in the Lang'Abner report of May 1998, NASA USA
Transition and Downsizing Review (page 1_), "An effective cross training program
relies on a rigorous certification process th: it clearly defines proficiency and currency
requirements .... This effort at cross-trait ing was felt by some of those interviewed
to be hampered by downsizing (no time t,_ do it). Some of those interviewed com-
mented that people are being moved to ur familiar areas with minimal training."
In its conversations with technicians at I<SC, the Panel's KSC team was told that
changing assignments under the SFOC t;ansition resulted in situations of uncer-
tainty among technicians in which person _el were less likely to call "time out" than
when a safety issue is clearly defined and u:lderstood by the responsible workers. The
Lang/Abner report made a similar observ ition (page 7): "... feelings were mixed
when asked if they were willing to say 'stop' or 'time-out' while performing a func-
tion or releasing a product when they were not totally certain they understood
the process or felt their products were ready." Adequacy of training and rigor in
certification is essential to eliminate these critical concerns.
Ref: Finding #3
This is a restatement of an issue raised in last year's ASAP Annual Report.
Specifically, the Panel believes that effective insight by NASA under the SF©C
must necessarily go beyond the traditional administrative skills associated with con-
tract monitoring. The technical complexity of the Space Shuttle and the ISS means
that no collection of data, in itself, will be sufficient to understand how the SF©C
and its subcontractors are performing their operational responsibilities. The current
generation of senior managers at KSC, JSC, and MSFC possess this depth of techni-
cal understanding because of their prior operational duties. However, as NASA's role
shifts from operations to oversight to insight and as obstacles continue in the orderly
hiring of new employees, special efforts will be needed to provide the next genera-
tion of senior managers with the technical experience needed to achieve a real
understanding of what is happening in Space Shuttle and ISS operations. Normal
"career development programs" are not sufficient to provide such understanding.
Special operational assignments and specific career paths will be necessary to develop
a cadre of leaders for future senior management roles. An element of this process
should be to ensure that a trained and qualified NASA presence is on the work floor
even as operational duties transition from NASA to the SFOC.
In short, as the SFOC transition proceeds, NASA will need to pay special attention
to achieving and maintaining the technical competence of those senior managers who
are charged with ensuring that the Space Shuttle and ISS are operated in a fully safe
manner.
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B. SPACESHUTTLEPROGRAM
Ref: Finding #4
KSC metrics published by the Office of Saf,.'ty and Mission Assurance (OSMA) show
charts such ',as time lost, exceedences of _vertime restrictions, numbers of reworks
required, reduction in the numbers of G)vernment Mandatory Inspection Points
(GMIPs), numbers of Incident/Error Review Board (IERB) incidents, and so forth,
which are tools better suited to the prograr_ management of cost and quality than to
safety. NASA's safety management procedures demand detailed attention to the
design, production, and procedures used ir the Space Shuttle. Any deviations from
these requirements would be of concern to safety, and must be evaluated on an indi-
vidual basis. Metrics alone will not produc_ the required insight into safety.
Subsystem managers at JSC do track safeq-related concerns, but they do not neces-
sarily report these as metrics. For example, there is an SF©C Incident Rate metric
that is tracked and published, but it does not include any close calls wherein the
potential for dollar damage is estimated tolbe less than $1,000.
"NASA Mishap Reporting and Investigating Policy" (NASA Policy Directive
8621.1G) defines the procedures that Ne_SA uses to report and correct mishaps.
OSMA's Report of Space Shuttle Program/U_ A Process Review states that United Space
Alliance's (USA's) IERB will report corre:tive actions taken to address processing
escapes, but leaves unclear what action NASA will take with this information. These
data could produce far more meaningful m,.'asures of safety on the Space Shuttle pro-
gram than metrics alone can provide.
Ref: Finding #5
Thousands of"deviations" and changes in the build paper and procedures used to pre-
pare the Space Shuttle are waiting to b_ incorporated into the operational work
paper. Metrics on workmanship errors indi,:ate that the principal cause of such errors
is "wrong" paper that is incorrect, incomplete, or difficult to understand. This has
long been a problem in preparing the Spa:e Shuttle for flight. Working with obso-
lete paper is both inefficient and potentialty hazardous to mission success.
USA is developing some promising paper'vork improvements, including the exten-
sive use of graphics and digital photograplLy to clarify the work steps, which should
lead to increased safety and product qualily. The pace of developing these upgrades
and incorporating them into the process p_ per should be speeded up. A management
system must also be developed that incorp)rates these changes rapidly and reliably.
Ref: Finding #6
Problems requiring cannibalization contin Je. Two recent examples are the Ku-band
deployed antenna assembly for STS-95 ard the continuing problem with the Mass
Memory Unit (MMU). At the same tirqe, the workload at the NASA Shuttle
LogisticsDepot(NSLD)issteadilyincreasing;thisis theresultofvendorsandsup-
pliersfindingit uneconomicalto furtherservetheprogram.Compoundingit allare
thedemandsof agingcomponentsandobsolescence,whichareaffectingshopwork-
loadasit becomesnecessaryto performmoremakeorrepairoperationsin-house.
RecentstaffingcutbacksatNSLDhaveexacerbatedtheproblems.
Throughout1998,USA hasconducteda continuinganalysisof approximately
80 itemsthatpresentedifficultieswith componentandsystemssupport.At the
sametime,the averagelengthof componentrepairturnaroundtimeshasbeen
steadilyincreasing.Theriseismainlyassociatedwithoriginalequipmentmanufac-
turersin theiroverhaulandrepairpractices,but it isalsoreflectedin theNSLD
effort.All thesesymptoms,ofcourse,havebeennotedinayearwhereinthelaunch
ratewasexceptionallyow.In the12monthscommencingin May1999,theSpace
Shuttlelogisticsystemwill betestedto theutmost.Therefore,it wouldseempru-
dentto resolveasmanyoutstandinglogisticsissuesassoonaspossible.
Inresolvingtheseoutstandinglogisticsi sues,it alsomustbeconsideredthatthereare
insufficientassetsin theSpaceShuttleprogramto supporti sexpectedlife.Thesup-
port of the ISSwill inevitablyrequirethe acquisitionof furtherSpaceShuttle
assets--andotonlyrelianceoninnovativeapproachesto extendingthelifeofexist-
ingresources.
Ref: Finding #7
NASA aircraft used for astronaut training support include T-38's and the Shuttle
Training Aircraft (STA), a modification to the Gulfstream II. All are aging with no
identified replacements. None have advanced nondestructive testing techniques
available for helping to determine the actual life remaining. Of particular concern
are the STA aircraft. They are rapidly approaching the end of their safe service lives,
and no replacements are scheduled. The flight profiles required of these aircraft are
more severe than those for which they were originally designed or certified.
Furthermore, the capability to forecast and catalog the actual fatigue life expended is
not precise. STA maintenance is excellent, but it cannot be expected to find every
defect when operated in the required training environment. Plans to replace the STA
with a newer aircraft need to be made.
The age of the T-38 aircraft is of additional concern. The aircraft are vintage 1960's,
and no replacement is in sight. The installed ejection seat does not accommodate the
full range of astronaut anthropometrics and is potentially life threatening for those at
the outer limits of reach and height. There is an ever-increasing need for time-
consuming and expensive corrosion control. Bulkhead and inlet modifications are
urgently needed, and a wing replacement program is under way. Engine nozzles may
be in this same category. The installed avionics do not match those of the Space
Shuttle orbiter and represent a serious training shortfall.
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There are current plans to continue to upg ade the T-38's so that their structural safety
is maintained and they are equipped for t light in today's air traffic control environ-
ment. NASA also has a comprehensive p ogram to assure the safety of these aircraft
before flight. It is essential that adequate funding for these efforts is maintained so that
the present, excellent safety record with tl_e training aircraft continues.
Ref: Finding #8
The use of simulation-based training is 'videly recognized as extremely important
and, as a result, is fairly well institutionaliz ._d in the Space Shuttle program. Similarly,
its use as a readiness verification and training tool is widely practiced in the aviation
and nuclear power industries as well as tt_e military. The value of simulation-based
training is unquestioned in these arenas. It is noteworthy that simulation-based train-
ing of Space Shuttle launch controllers in the wake of a long standdown was a
significant factor in the smooth resumption of operations for STS-95.
A wide variety of forms of simulated opera:ions are in use for training, including neu-
tral buoyancy facilities, the use of actu_d launch or flight control consoles with
simulated data, and the use of computer-_ ased simulations. Different levels of simu-
lation fidelity (and corresponding differences in their developmental cost) have been
used. Of particular interest are situations such as at KSC, where some of the actual
operational hardware can be used in a trai _ing mode because the incremental cost of
simulation development in many such cases is minimal. NASA should thus consider
the development and use of simulation-ba _ed training throughout the Agency in any
difficult or complicated operation if an a[ propriate level of fidelity can be achieved
at a reasonable cost.
C. INTERNATIONALSPACESTATION(ISS) PROGRAM
Ref: Finding #9
Multi-Element Integrated Testing (MEIT) was introduced into the I55 program in
1997. MElT has good potential for verifying compatibility among the several ele-
ments of the ISS in ground-based tests before the hardware is delivered to the launch
processors. When scheduling dictates it is prudent to deliver hardware to MElT
before qualification or other testing is complete, the potential is created for subse-
quent hardware changes or repair that may invalidate the MEIT results.
NASA and Boeing have developed an extensive array of testing procedures for inte-
grated ISS software based largely on the use of simulations. At one end of the
spectrum, Early Software Integration testing is used. To begin integration testing as
soon as possible, software modules that are not fully validated are used in integrated
testing with other components. By so doing, NASA and Boeing hope to uncover
errors at an earlier stage than would be possible from usual techniques. While the
technique has merit, its difference from more usual procedures has been a source of
confusion--and possibly challenge for various review groups. The point to be
made, though, is that as long as full integration testing is performed with validated
software later in the overall process, the technique is fine. Experience with this
method has been very good so far. However, NASA needs to do a better job of artic-
ulating how all parts of the process fit together. Also, final, full integration testing
must always be performed with validated components.
Ref: Finding #10
A valid MEIT result requires that emulators/simulators correctly reflect the hardware
and interfaces they substitute for in testing. Therefore, the simulations used should
ultimately be certified or verified to behave exactly as their flight counterparts. Errors
in the simulators could result in undetected errors in actual flight software. Thus,
these simulators play as important a role in the overall process as does the actual
flight software. Documentation reviewed by the Panel suggested that some testing
might only be done with simulations of limited fidelity.
Most testing performed at the Software Verification Facility (SVF) necessarily uses
simulations for many components. The MEIT testing thus becomes the place in
which the greatest amount of actual flight hardware can be included. Because not all
hardware will be available at one time, including some that is already on orbit, sim-
ulation must also be used with MEIT.
It is important that when an element has been placed on orbit, it is replaced in MEIT
by a validated simulation. In addition, it is important that as modifications are made
to an element on orbit, such as correcting a latent software error or replacing a hard-
ware unit with an upgraded unit, simulations are updated to reflect the current
on-orbit configuration.
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Ref: Finding #11
Nothing better serves the accuracy and fi :ielity of testing than having the ultimate
users--those whose lives will depend on the proper functioning of the system--
involved in the testing. While test eng neers and others involved are certainly
competent to validate designs and catch 1:roblems, astronaut involvement brings an
additional dimension to the process. Also, such participation gives the crew an addi-
tional opportunity to familiarize themselw_s with the systems--a familiarization that
would become essential in the event of an emergency. It is recognized that available
crew time can be scarce and expensive, btt this should not prompt any tendency to
avoid requesting astronaut involvement. Recent experience with ISS hardware in
the Space Station Processing Facility l_as highlighted the importance of crew
involvement. It should be made routine.
Ref: Findings #12 and #13
The ISS currently has a requirement fo" a single Crew Return Vehicle (CRV).
Consideration is being given to increasing this to two CRV's once the ISS reaches
assembly complete. There is a baselined lccation for one of the CRV's on the Unity
Node, and analyses are under way to ident fy the best position for a second vehicle if
one is added.
The X-38 is currently undergoing develol:ment at JSC, and a scaled version of the
vehicle is being drop tested from the B 52 carrier aircraft at the Dryden Flight
Research Center (DFRC). The X-38 conc__pt for the ISS CRV is based on maximiz-
ing the use of existing technology and off-_he-shelf equipment; however, the current
design includes at least 15 unproved techrologies. For example, the use of a parafoil
to gain a large cross-range capability must l_ecertified for human use. The automated
guidance and control system (including scftware codes) will have to be certified by
extensive testing. The heat shield is anoth,.'r area of concern that will need extensive
certification testing. In fact, the entire CRV will have to be thoroughly analyzed and
proved before the vehicle is fielded as the 'lifeboat" for the ISS.
Plans are for the ISS program to issue a R_:quest for Proposal (RFP) for a U.S. CRV
in the spring of 1999. The planned RFP is basically for a design to the X-38 specifi-
cation, although the responders will have .'ome latitude for changes. The target date
for deploying the first CRV on orbit is Ma_ch 2003, which is an ambitious schedule.
Until a CRV is available, the plan is t 3 use Soyuz capsules manufactured and
launched in Russia. Each modified Soyuz i.' capable of returning three crewmembers.
ISS mission rules dictate that a crew canr ot be left on the station unless sufficient
return capability for every crewmember is tvailable from an attached Space Shuttle
or one or more CRV's.
The Panel conducted a review of CRV req airements for the Space Station Freedom,
which was published as Appendix D to its Annual Report for 1992. That review con-
cluded that there was a clear need to ha,'e two CRV's on orbit, each of which is
capable of returning the entire crew. There are several reasons why mission objectives
dictate two CRV's. The first and perhaps the most obvious is to limit the likelihood
that a crewmember will be cut off from access to a CRV by a fire, toxic spill, or depres-
surization event. To minimize this possibility, the two CRV's must be located at
dispersed sites, which are chosen on the basis of expected crew positions during ISS
operations.
There are, however, at least two other equally compelling reasons for deploying two
CRV's. First, the availability of two-vehicles greatly increases the probability of
having a functioning CRV when needed without forcing unrealistic or extraordinar-
ily expensive reliability requirements on the design. Second, a two-vehicle
deployment permits sending less than the full crew home in the case of a medical
emergency. If only a single CRV were available, the entire crew would have to return
when any one crewmember became seriously ill or injured.
The current situation leads to several concerns. First, the plans to use the Soyuz as
an interim CRV have been complicated by an uncertain delivery schedule. Each
Soyuz only has an on-orbit life of 6 months. Therefore, the ISS depends on a con-
tinuing flow of Soyuz capsules in a CRV configuration and sufficient Russian
launcher capability until a U.S. CRV is ready. The Russians may be unable to meet
a long-term ISS need for Soyuz return vehicles. Also, if the planned availability date
of early 2003 for a CRV slips, the need for Soyuz replacements will grow, thereby fur-
ther exacerbating the problem.
In light of this situation, NASA must clearly accelerate the CRV development
schedule as much as possible. This was also recommended by the Report of the Cost
Assessment and Validation Task Force of the International Space Station ("Chabrow
Report"), which specifically suggested combining the X-38 and CRV programs as
soon as feasible to achieve the earliest possible CRV operational readiness date. The
concern, however, is that in the haste to ready a CRV and avoid dependence on the
Russians, there may be a tendency to omit important risk assessment and testing
steps. An appropriate approach is needed that moves the U.S. CRV forward with all
deliberate speed while doing everything possible to ensure Soyuz availability until its
replacement is ready.
Ref: Finding #14
The field of radiation health physics is far from an exact science. For example, radi-
ation detection and recording devices are recognized as less than adequate. Total
exposure is not measured (for example, the neutron contribution is not recorded).
Exposures of crewmembers who have performed similar on-orbit tasks and routines
on the same flight vary considerably, casting doubt on the accuracy of the dosimetry.
Models used to predict the exposures of crewmembers are discrepant. Certain
space/solar events cause significant and unpredictable variations in the radiation
field. In addition, the long-term effects of radiation on the human body (cancers and
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genetics) lack a definitive understanding All of these unknowns, plus others, should
dictate a very conservative approach to _ontrolling exposure to radiation. The gov-
erning principle universally accepted in the nuclear business, from weapons
production to power generation to medical radiology, is "As Low As Reasonably
Achievable" (ALARA). To that end, the U.S. domestic airlines limit annual crew
exposure to 20 REM, and the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program limits crew and
workers to 5 REM per year and no more than 3 REM per quarter. The ISS, on the
other hand, allows an exposure of 40 REid per year.
Design or construction limitations in shii lding for lSS modules may be countered to
some extent by well-planned procedures _nd routines. Considerations for minimizing
radiation exposure should be better facto;'ed into ISS designs and operations.
Ref: Finding #15
There are many gaps in the relatively new field of science that examines the effects
on humans of radiation exposure during s:_ace flight. For example, research is needed
to establish the effects of linear energy mtnsfer radiation, to determine the true con-
tribution of neutrons to total radiation fi .'ld, to develop a model for the exposure of
astronauts conducting an EVA during geomagnetic storms, and to calculate trans-
mission functions under magnetically dist.arbed conditions. Other unknowns include
such factors as the effects of secondary _adiation from shielding, variances in dose
from a "normal" state to solar maximum, the fact that current radiation limits are
based on data derived from weapons acute exposure (whereas ISS crew exposure will
be low dose rate), and efforts to impro,,e the performance of personal dosimetry
devices, among others.
The investment in resources to expand re earch in radiation health physics should be
made now. In addition to helping the k¢S, it would also provide an advance on a
Mars mission.
Ref: Finding #16
NASA satellites and ISS elements mal, e extensive use of pyrotechnic initiators
("pyros") for such tasks as deploying stnctures, releasing holddowns, and opening
valves. When these work as intended, tl-ey dissipate their energy in the process of
performing their intended tasks. If they fa I to fire, however, they not only may leave
a task uncompleted, but also create a pote ltial hazard for an EVA astronaut. A visual
inspection often cannot determine whether the pyro has fired. As a result, EVA
crews cannot be sure from a visual inspection whether they face a potential hazard
from unfired pyros.
To increase safety when EVA crews mu_t work in the vicinity of pyros, a means
should be developed to make the pyros "_ire evident." Simply, some visual method
should be included with each pyro so that its firing will leave a conspicuous trace. For
example, a small amount of inert dye might be added to the charge so that it leaves
a distinctive color after it had been fired. This would make it easy for an astronaut to
determine when pyros were still potentially live, thereby avoiding unnecessary risks.
Once such a means is developed, its use should be mandated in all NASA applica-
tions that might be encountered by an EVA asmmaut.
Ref: Finding #17
A sense of teamwork and bonding is developed during the conduct of training on
complex operations. Last-minute substitutions in a crew can disrupt that team envi-
ronment, while the new member plays "catchup" with his new crew's style. If backup
crews participate in some significant training exercises with the primary crew, the
potential for disruption can be minimized.
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Ref: Finding #18
The success of the 1SS program depends heavily on EVA assembly operations. The
procurement cycle for Extravehicular _4obility Units (EMU's) is about 2 years.
Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue (SAFER_ units, both U.S. and Russian, also require
significant time to manufacture and qurlify. The EVA project has been limited to
acquiring only the minimum numbers :urrently planned. This is a very success-
oriented inventory. Accidental damage or complete loss of EMU's during the extensive
assembly operations could compromise such a plan. SAFER units (with a 1-year
certification) must be rotated to mainta n three units on orbit. Damage could pre-
clude meeting that requirement. Soun:l risk management suggests the need to
procure additional units and spare components.
Ref: Finding #19
Although the EMU sizes were selected based on anticipated crew size distribution,
the Panel is concerned that at some corrbinations of anthropometry and capability,
a crewmember might not be able to perform the complete range of normal and emer-
gency operations.
Ref: Finding #20
Present EVA equipment and procedures are based on 20-year-old designs and tech-
nology. While NASA has had a strong Research and Technology (R&T) program
that has led to the identification of signif cant improvements in EVA equipment and
procedures, cutbacks in the funding for lhe R&T program have curtailed the possi-
bility of the development of efficiency and risk reduction improvements. There is a
clear need for further advances to suppor: EVA activities over the extended lifetime
of the ISS and beyond. Based on prior R_T achievements, a relatively small invest-
ment now has the potential to yield sign ficant risk and cost reductions over the life
of the ISS.
Ref: Finding #21
The Russian Orlan suit operates at a hig her differential suit pressure (5.8 psi) than
that of the U.S. EMU, which operates _ t a 4.3 psi differential. Thus, personnel in
underwater training in the Russian Hydr )lab are at a significantly higher total pres-
sure, with a resulting increase in susceptil,ility to the bends. In addition, the protocol
used in the Hydrolab does not match that used in the U.S. Neutral Buoyancy
Laboratory (NBL) as far as prebreathe and bends monitoring are concerned. Also,
the Hydrolab does not use Nitrox, which is used in the NBL as an aid to reduce bends
and increase allowable training time at depth. There are major differences in the
training and safety environments between the two facilities. A thorough under-
standing of these differences is required, md training safety should be monitored.
Ref: Finding #22
The long-standing Space Shuttle program prebreathe protocol of 4 hours (from a
14.7-psia cabin) has proven to provide a minimal risk of bends. Any change to that
protocol should be based only on credible empirical evidence.
Ref: Finding #23
ISS and Shuttle crews conducting EVA's are at maximum risk for significant radia-
tion exposure. It may not be possible to terminate critical operations during a
radiation "alarm" condition. Additional shielding for the EMU's would mitigate this
risk. This is an example of crucial research that should be undertaken in view of the
magnitude of the EVA tasks facing the ISS program during the assembly phase, as
well as the need to protect the astronauts.
Ref: Finding #24
Because all international crews are trained to perform EVA's in either the EMU or
the ©rlan suit, there is much flexibility possible in the scheduling of EVA operations.
EVA ground rule 4.3.2.12 states: "The nominal plan for ISS EVA planning is to
select either EMUs or Orlans for a particular increment." This means that one or the
other suit will be selected for an increment of several months and that all EVAs
during that increment will use the designated suit without regard for the purpose of
that particular EVA. This seems overly constraining and may not allow for the opti-
mization of crew time on orbit. It also can restrict a crew working on their own
portion of the ISS from using their own suits.
Ref: Finding #25
The SAFER system is intended to give an astronaut the capability to return to the
parent vehicle in the event that the tether, normally used to prevent the astronaut from
drifting away during an EVA, becomes disconnected. The functioning of the SAFER
unit can therefore be critical to crew survival when an astronaut becomes untethered.
A basic requirement imposed on the original design of the Space Shuttle was that,
in the event of a series of failures in a critical system, redundancy must provide fail-
operational, fail-operational, fail-safe capability. This requirement has been adhered
to in the major hardware components and assemblies, but it was not applied to the
design of the SAFER unit, in which a single NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) was pro-
vided to open gas flow to the manifold. There is no redundancy provided to back up
the function of the NSI and therefore no backup means of initiating the gas flow that
the unit requires to operate. Zero fault tolerance may be appropriate for emergency
equipment on the grounds that it is only needed after another failure has occurred, but
such equipment surely is expected to be at least capable of being activated when
required. Thus, redundancy for activation should be at least single fault tolerant. A
SAFER failure such as the one that occurred in the test on STS-86 could have been
a Criticality 1 failure if the equipment had been called on in a true emergency.
ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1998
41
AEROSPACE SAFETY
ADVISORY PANEL
The detailed March 30, 1998, report on the NSI failure (STS-86 USA Simplified Aid
for EVA Rescue (SAFER) Failure--Mislvp Date: October I, 1997--Failure Review
Board Report) emphasizes that the design, _f the activating power supply did not take
into account the increase of NSl resistance as power was applied to the device. This
was a fundamental failure to recognize th.." nature of the device intended to be acti-
vated by fusing a bridge wire. The docume_tation of the NSI on which the design was
based is a "fly-sheet" specification, which Joes not supply sufficient detail of this sort
nor specify the impedance versus supply vc ,ltage (or admittance versus supply current)
for an adequate power supply. Clearly, the variation of the impedance with activating
current was not included in the specification, nor was it considered in the design.
Contributing to the failure to identify thk problem at an early date was the fact that
an NSI was used in only two tests on the certification unit. For all other certification
tests and all flight units, an inadequate e nulator (a fixed resistance of the nominal
unactivated value) was used.
Because the NSI is used operationally throughout NASA, the circumstances leave
open the possibility that other users may have not properly understood the require-
ments for the design of the firing circuitq. This warrants further examination.
E.AERO-SPACET CHNOLOGY
Ref: Finding #26
The President has directed that all efforts be made to reduce the aircraft accident
rate, to reduce the emissions and perceived noise levels of aircraft, and, while main-
taining safety, to triple the aviation system throughput and reduce the cost of air
travel. NASA, through its "Three Pillars" approach, has defined a roadmap directed
at achieving these goals, but they cannot be achieved without the total cooperation
of industry, academia, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Arguably,
the most important of these is the FAA; yet that agency has recently withdrawn sig-
nificant funding--particularly from the safety efforts that NASA was pursuing
cooperatively with the FAA. Unless the FAA renews its funding participation, the
pursuit of Pillar One, Global Civil Aviation, could well come to naught, and the
President's directive will end up being forgotten. More importantly, the laudable and
extremely important goals set for Pillar One will have a much reduced probability of
being achieved.
Ref: Finding #27
Orbital Sciences Corporation (©SC), in accordance with a NASA contract and
NASA funding, manages the X-34 program. ©SC is principally the systems integra-
tor, with more than 30 subcontractors involved. While OSC's program and fiscal
management seems sound, the same cannot be said for all facets of the X-34 safety
program. Particularly worrisome is the apparent lack of adequate testing and analysis
with regard to separation of the vehicle from the L-1011 and legacy software.
While wind tunnel tests simulating the separation of the X-34 from the L-1011 have
been successfully completed using scale models of the two vehicles, more test and
analysis may be required. The X-34 release mechanism is based on the flight-proven
Pegasus release mechanism designed by OSC, but it may still require more testing for
safety assurance. The aerodynamic forces and flying qualities of the combined vehi-
cles will also be assessed during various prerelease test flights.
For the X-34, intentions are to reuse software from other systems, such as the Space
Shuttle and Pegasus. Experience in other situations has demonstrated conclusively
that, past satisfactory performance notwithstanding, to avoid unsafe performance,
legacy software must be subjected to rigorous verification and validation before oper-
ational use. The X-34 flight software is scheduled to be carried through a thorough
verification and validation testing process by OSC. Performance tests of the X-34
navigation system hardware and software have already been conducted at the White
Sands Missile Range using an aircraft platform.
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Given the plethora of participants in the {-34 program, it is essential that a safety
plan with clearly defined responsibilities, particularly for safety integration,
be spelled out. Examples of currently existing gray areas are procurement and manu-
facturing quality assurance, preflight test and flight test plans, and range safety
(including flight termination).
Re]:.. Finding #28
The flight profiles for the first X-33 tests will originate in the Air Force Flight Test
Center (Edwards) test range and are scheduled to end at Michael Army Airfield on
Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, which is _ storage facility for chemical and biolog-
ical weapons. Later tests will go from Edwards to Malmstrom Air Force Base in
Montana. While these routes generally traverse unpopulated areas through estab-
lished military corridors, they also cross seceral major highways and terminate near
vulnerable areas. Also, should there be an unexpected flight termination, the impact
could, conceivably, be in a more populated area. This is particularly true because the
destruct mechanism depends on a hard-over flight control signal leading to an aero-
dynamic breakup that could result in a ralher large ground impact footprint. If this
were to happen while unspent propellant is still aboard, the results could be disas-
trous. Communications failure or command termination failure could exacerbate the
situation. The Air Force is conducting the appropriate risk analyses, but NASA must
play an integral role in these analyses and not abdicate any of that responsibility to
the Air Force or any other agency.
For the X-34, while a much shorter range vehicle, the flight termination system
might necessarily be activated with unspen : fuel on board. Appropriate analyses seem
to be under way, but, again, NASA must l_e involved.
F,COMPUTERHARDWARE/SOFTWARE
Ref: Finding #29
Throughout the history of the Space Shuttle program, there has been a continuing
demand to improve the functionality and maintainability of the General Purpose
Computer (GPC) system through changes to the GPC software. Virtually every flight
sees some level of software revision. At longer intervals, major upgrades to the soft-
ware take place. There has been a general tendency for the memory and processor
requirements to grow during this process. There is now little growth capacity left.
The software has also become extremely intricate and difficult to maintain because
of the many changes and the lack of modularity.
The current GPC is technologically obsolete, and maintenance issues can be
expected to continue to increase. While NASA purchased a supply of replacement
chips and components, there is a question of whether this supply can last the life
of the Space Shuttle. The obsolescence applies not only to the hardware, but also
to the software development techniques forced by the hardware. The software is far
less modularized than current technology and good practice would indicate. This,
in turn, makes it more difficult and expensive to make changes, perform testing,
and ensure that there are no undesirable side effects.
While there is not an imminent crisis in the Space Shuttle computer and avionics
systems, there are three critical factors:
1. The system is currently approaching its capacity limits.
2. The time required for any major upgrade in computer/avionics hardware or
redevelopment of the basic flight software can be very long. The last complete
GPC upgrade took 8 years.
3. The delay of risk-reducing upgrades that are inevitable only postpones their
safety benefits.
Ref: Finding #30
l-loads are constants that tailor the Space Shuttle flight software to a specific flight.
There are thousands of these constants. Most are calculated and folded into a flight
software load well ahead of time through an elaborate procedure that includes a
number of checks to be as certain as possible that things are correct. Some, such as
those related to day-of-launch winds, are uplinked only shortly before flight. The
I-loads are not all independent values, however; some depend on others.
An issue has arisen with respect to I-loads that is indicative of a much bigger prob-
lem that should be addressed. There is no formal requirement that dependent I-loads
be recalculated or checked when real-time I-load updates are performed via com-
mand load uplinks. In Panel discussions on this matter, it was revealed that the
dependencies, in many cases, are known only in the minds of specific individuals in
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the program. There is no map of the dependencies so that someone else can ascertain
what recalculations need to be done. While the requirements issue is being worked,
there is no evidence that anyone is working on developing a dependency map.
This is indicative of the broader issue of undocumented knowledge that exists in the
heads of only a few individuals. The dimensions of this problem are not known.
Although it could require a large effort o document the key procedural items for
Space Shuttle and ISS computer operatio'ls, it is crucial to do so.
Ref: Finding #31
An incident occurred recently with the [.aunch Processing System (LPS) in which
an operator thought he or she was intera:ting with a simulation in a test mode. In
reality, the operator was connected to an actual vehicle. While there were no severe
consequences, this incident points out that there is no nonprocedural LPS lockout to
prevent this kind of inadvertent access to a real vehicle. At present, it is possible for
an operator to mistakenly interact with a :'eal vehicle when he or she intended to be
in a different room interacting with a simt lation. In the new control room associated
with the Checkout and Launch Control _;ystem (CLCS), the plan is to address this
issue by requiring each person entering the control room to go to the flight or launch
director and obtain authorization for an activity. Each person will then have to log
in to the activity. The plan is to have the CLCS display the activity on the screen so
that people can see what activity is being :arried out. The avoidance of a recurrence
of the incident noted in the finding is to be handled by these procedural means.
The CLCS will allow the handling of t_o orbiters in Orbiter Processing Facilities
from the same control room. In achieving this, a system is being built to keep the
data streams completely separate at the tser interface level. Something similar for
distinguishing simulations from real activ ties and locking a user out from anything
other than the activity for which the dirt ctor has authorized him or her is needed.
NASA is urged to try to incorporate this ':ind of safety capability into the CLCS.
Ref: Finding #32
There is a fimdamental dichotomy betwe_ n the use of rapidly changing commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) software developmellt tools and long-lived systems. In particu-
lar, the compilers and software developmel tt tools that NASA uses for programs such
as the ISS and the CLCS ate a matter of.:oncem. The principal difficulty with tool
maintenance arises from the fact that the lifetime of the operational software is more
than an order of magnitude greater than tt:e update cycle on the COTS tools used for
developing the software products. For exarr ple, the ISS code is expected to be used for
a decade or r.wo, while the tools used to de velop it are often upgraded annually.
This is a very important fundamental probiem. If NASA uses a COTS product that is
current at the time of a software change, a recertification of the tool would be neces-
sary for virtually all program changes. If NASA tries to stay with the version of a
COTStoolusedforthebasicdevelopmentofthesoftware,thenNASAwillprobably
haveto assumetheresponsibilityformaintainingthetoolon thecomputersystems
usedbecauseit isunlikelythatthevendorwill doso.Stayingwitholdertoolversions
alsomeansforegoingfixesandimprovementsincorporatedin laterversionsbythe
supplier.Eitherchoiceisassociatedwithmanyproblems.Whiletherehasbeendis-
cussionofupdatingsomeofthetools,suchascompilers,thisshouldnotbedoneuntil
astrategyisdevelopedfor addressingtheoverallproblem.Otherwise,NASAcould
incurunexpectedcosts,incompatibilities,anddelaysindeliveringnewsoftware.
Tobeginaddressingtheproblemsassociatedwith thetoolsused,a"toolsczar"has
beenappointed.Thisisanimportantroteandmustbeaffordedtheresourcesandthe
authorityto setpolicythatcanmaximizethevalueofthetoolstotheprojects.
Ref: Finding #33
The Mass Memory Unit (MMU) currently being deployed on the ISS is a mechani-
cal rotating device. There are serious concerns about its long-term reliability.
Although this risk has been deemed acceptable, it is no longer necessary. An alter-
native is to use flash memory technology. A prototype has already been built
that would enable the replacement of the 300-megabyte mechanical units with
500-megabyte solid-state units. The cost is relatively small.
NASA also is currently studying the use of Pentium technology to replace the
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM) central processing units. Presently, the MOBILE
Pentium MMX technology has passed initial screening. The next step is to build an
engineering version for testing with existing flight software. Efforts are also being
focused on software tools and the development platform on which they run.
Developing a long-term tool maintenance strategy should precede any compiler or
platform change.
The expected quantity and use of ISS onboard laptops makes it impractical to upgrade
all Portable Computer Systems (PCS's) simultaneously. Rather, NASA and Boeing
expect to upgrade the laptops in an evolutionary manner, incorporating new technol-
ogy laptops from time to time. They plan to make the first upgrade at flight 5A. The
next hardware upgrade is planned for 2001, with successive upgrades at approximately
5-year intervals. This seems to be an appropriate strategy for planning and executing
an ISS computer upgrade and might be used as a model for other ISS components.
Ref: Finding #34
The configuration management of ISS software has been improved with Boeing's
adoption of a single-configuration management system for all software flowing
through the Software Development and Integration Facility (SDIL) at JSC. There
are still some concerns, however. The standardization of software configuration
applies only to software developed by Boeing or that NASA and Boeing have entered
into the SDIL. All software produced by vendors or outside of NASA and Boeing is
not included in the configuration management.
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Most notably, the source code produced b_. the Russians for the Service Module (SM)
does not come under configuration contr _1, nor is it ever delivered to NASA. The
executable code (compiled and linked code) comes under the configuration man-
agement system only when it has been delivered to the SDIL.
In addition, there is concern regarding t_ e SM simulation that is used in the SDIL
and as part of MElT at KSC to test softv_ are in systems that interface with the SM.
The Russians supply this simulation software. The SDIL only gets the upgrades at
infrequent intervals when the Russian pa 'tners bring new code to be integrated and
tested. In between these points in time, :he Russian partners update and use their
updated simulations, while simulations in the United States are out of synchroniza-
tion with the version the Russians are usi ag. The coordination between upgrades to
the SM simulation should be improved.
Ref: Finding #35
The ISS relies heavily on software for sn ooth, safe operation. The involvement of
several countries in developing ISS softw_ re further complicates an already complex
program. Currently, each software development organization and each international
partner has separate standards for software development. This makes the general
management of the program more difficult. It also heightens the potential for sched-
ule slips and for shortcuts that could jeopardize safety. A more standard approach to
developing and delivering software shouk: be adopted to avoid the typical pitfalls of
large software projects.
Areas to be included in standards and bes: practices are:
• Proven processes for involving opera_:ors, crewmembers, and other users in the
requirement specification, conceptual design, and test planning activities for the
software
• State-of-the-art processes and minimt m criteria for computer, programming lan-
guage, and tool selection and mainte_ _ance
• Requirements for programmer trainin; levels
• Philosophies for testing, including str,.'ss and long-duration tests
• Independent verification and validatim requirements
• Configuration management controls
• Simulation validation and maintena _ce approaches to ensure that simulators
accurately represent the requirements md reflect the current state of the software
• Processes for maintaining and upgrading the software
It is further recommended that the So"tware Engineering lnstitute's Capability
Maturity Model be used to assess the capr bility level of each participating organiza-
tion to successfully deploy complex softw_ re systems.
Ref: Finding #36
The development of complex ISS software systems involves many disciplines and
requires extensive experience with space systems. Project histories indicate that the
broad involvement of users and key discipline specialists in the early phases of software
development pays off in the increased understanding required for success. A recent
study published in Communications of the ACM that reported on software projects in
three countries indicated that the lack of top management commitment and poor
understanding of requirements are the most likely causes of software project failures.
One of the most prevalent reasons for software cost overruns and schedule delays is
the lack of user involvement in the planning of the system. The cost of finding a
problem in the early phases of requirements specification, conceptual design, and test
planning is relatively low. If discipline specialists and users are not involved in these
early phases, problems may not be discovered until late in the test and integration
phases when they can be very costly to fix.
The concurrent engineering approach will minimize rework costs and schedule
delays. It will also enhance the safety, performance, and acceptance of the software.
Ref: Finding #3 7
The Data Encryption System (DES) is widely used for encrypting data in a variety of
Government and commercial activities. NASA made the decision several years ago
to use DES for encrypting the command uplinks to the ISS, with the expectation of
upgrading the security system before the end of the station lifetime. DES is certified
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and is based on the
use of a 56-bit encryption code. The present certification of DES as an acceptable
encryption code expired in 1998. It has been expected that NIST will recertify it for
4 or 5 more years and then replace it with an advanced encryption system.
For the past 2 years, there has been an organized effort to break the DES code. In
July 1998, DES was broken with a personal computer and approximately $250,000 of
special purpose hardware in just 56 hours. The code cracking recovered one DES key
and deciphered a simple, one-sentence message in English. A complete description
of the technology, including all code, all circuit diagrams, the chip source code, and
the system architecture, is available in a newly released book on sale for less than
$30. Whether or not NIST will recertify DES, in light of the recent success at break-
ing the DES code, will not be known until after the finalization of this annual report.
There is a more secure encryption system, called Triple DES, which uses three dif-
ferent 56-bit keys. NASA did not use this initially because this code is under export
control and there was concern about difficulties in getting permission for the inter-
national partners to use this code. Over the past year, NASA has made plans to use
triple DES with the Ku-band antenna when it is put in place for use with the
Japanese module. The Ku-band antenna will be available when the U.S. Lab module
is attached. Although they do not yet have permission to use Triple DES with Japan,
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the National Security Agency (NSA) has recently indicated that it will not object
to the issuance of an export license. While NSA does not issue the license, its deci-
sion to not object should help NASA secure an export license not only for Japan but
for other international partners as well. I here would be obvious security benefits
from incorporating the encryption protocol as soon as possible. NASA is working on
the upgrade of the current S-band system _n parallel with the deployment of Triple
DES in the Ku-band system, and negotiations on the use of Triple DES are ongoing
with both the Japanese and European space agencies.
NASA has some protections for the uplinl: in addition to that offered by the DES,
including command signal string authenlication and the use of NSA-generated
encryption keys. First, anyone trying to brt :ak the DES code would have to capture
transmitted sequences and know that they were uplink commands. One would have
to address the fact that the ISS would only be in contact with a specific location on
Earth about 10 minutes of each orbit. One would have to know the command format,
and one would have to address timing constraints on the use of command uplinks.
Nevertheless, while not openly advertised, none of this information is classified, and
a determined adversary could probably obtidn this information.
At present, NASA has 4,000 keys availab e for each of the three main ISS uplink
functions. "l-_ley could change one key a d; Lyfor 11 years, or one key per hour for a
year and a half, while they are developinLg and installing a more secure system.
However, this alone is unlikely to make br, mking the DES code sufficiently difficult
when one considers the probabilistic nature of the search.
In view of the recent event, it must now be assumed that, if there is the potential for
a credible threat to ISS uplink, the DES encryption scheme, regardless of when keys
are changed, is not going to provide adeqm te protection. A major question, then, is
whether or not there is a credible threatt ning group. NASA has said it receives
formal direct threat reports from NSA an really, although there has not been one
since the breaking of DES in July. Inforrral reports are relayed to NASA as new
threats arise, as often as daily. NASA has .aid it knows of no explicit threat to the
ISS uplink at the present time.
There has not yet been a careful, detailed analysis of the degree of protection the
system has under the new circumstances of he breaking of DES. It would be useful to
know how much protection really is availa 4e when all of the factors are taken into
account. Indeed, for something of the value md safety intensity of the ISS, one should
have a precise analysis of its vulnerability. N SA should be able to perform this kind of
analysis for NASA. NASA is urged to worl, with NSA to obtain such an analysis.
The time to make an update to the security ;ystem is significant. Should a threat arise
after the launch of the initial ISS componeats when it is likely to be more visible in
the world news, it is unlikely NASA could tespond in a timely manner. Because there
was a belief earlier that the risk warranted i he use of a secure encryption system and
therearemanyattemptedbreak-instotheNASAcomputersystemseachmonth,the
Panelbelievesthatthereisstillreasontoprotecthecommandsystem.In addition,
overtheextendedlifeoftheISS,it maywellbeimportantto offerNASA'spayload
customerstheuseofasecurencryptionsystemtoprotectheiruploadedanddown-
loadedata.It thereforeseemsreasonablefor NASA to upgradethedatauplink
securitysystemassoonaspossibleandtoconsiderinstallingdownlinksecurityaswell.
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NASARESPONSETO1997 ANNUALRI ORT
SUMMARY
NASA responded on September 14, 1998, to the "Findings and Recommendations"
from the Annual Report for 1997. NASA's response to each report item is categorized
by the Panel as "open, continuing, or closed." Open items are those on which the
Panel differs with the NASA response in one or more respects. They are typically
addressed by a new finding, recommendation, or observation in this report.
Continuing items involve concerns that are an inherent part of NASA operations or
have not progressed sufficiently to permit a final determination by the Panel. These
will remain a focus of the Panel's activities during 1999. Items considered answered
adequately are deemed closed.
Based on the Panel's review of the NASA response and the information gathered
during the 1998 period, the status of the recommendations made in the Annual
Report for 1997 is presented on the following page.
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RECOMMENDATION
No. Subject
la NASA and United Space Alliance's (US Vs) reaffirmation of safety
before schedule before cost
1b NASA's development of training and carter paths leading to
qualification for senior NASA Space Shuttle management positions
lc NASA's continued commitment that a trained and qualified
Government personnel presence is maintained on the work floor
ld NASA and USA's continued search, dew lopment, test, and
establishment of operations and processing metrics
2 KSC's expansion of structured surveillance and their development of
valid and reliable metrics
3 Certification of Self-Contained Atmosph eric Protective Ensemble
(SCAPE) personnel
4 Cross-training of NASA and USA persol tnel
5 Downsizing of personnel and the reducticn of Government Mandatory
Inspection Points (GM1Ps) and NASA s_fety inspections
6 Adherence to Super Light Weight Tank _SLWT} manufacturing and
quality control procedures
7 SLWT design requirements
8 Test intervals for flight support motor (F,C,M) static test firings
9 Restoration and upgrading of line-replac_ able units
10 Continuation of task management integration of the formerly
separate logistics contracts
11 Increased cannibalization rates
12 Readiness of ISS assemblies prior to shiplaent
13 Continued examination of the Shuttle-lV ir program for ISS benefits
14 ISS crew radiation exposure levels
15 Review, finalize, and document Caution md Warning (C&W) system
design requirements
16 Revaluation of the achievable ISS softwa re development and test
schedule
17 Importance of maintaining software development tools
18 Upgrading the ISS computer system
19 Adequate Independent Verification and galidation (IV&V) funding
for the Checkout and Launch Control S, stem (CLCS)
S_tus
Continuing
Continuing
Open
Continuing
Open
Closed
Open
Continuing
Closed
Continuing
Closed
Continuing
Closed
Open
Closed
Closed
Open
Continuing
Continuing
Open
Open
Closed
Mr. Richard D. Blomberg 
Chairman 
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel 
1010 Summer Street 
Stamford, CT 06905-5503 
Dear Mr. Blomberg: 
In accordance with your introductory letter dated 
February 1998 in the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) 
Annual Report, enclosed is NASA's detailed response to 
Section 11, "Findings and Recommendations." 
The ASAP'S efforts in assisting NASA to maintain the 
highest possible safety standards are commendable. Your 
recommendations are highly regarded and continue to play an 
important role in risk reduction in NASA programs. 
We thank you and your Panel members for your valuable 
contributions. ASAP recommendations receive the full 
attention of NASA senior management. In particular, I 
expect that NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance 
will track resolution of these issues as part of their role 
in independent assessment. 
We welcome the continuance of this beneficial working 
relationship with the Panel. 
Enclosure 
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Findings,Recommendations,andResponses
A. SPACESHUTTLEPROGRAM
OPERATIONS/PROCESSING
Finding #1
Operations and processing in accordance _¢ith the Space Flight Operations Contract
(SFOC) have been satisfactory. Neverthe]ess, lingering concerns include: the danger
of not keeping foremost the overarching goal of safety before schedule before cost;
the tendency in a success-oriented environment to overlook the need for continued
fostering of frank and open discussion; the press of budget inhibiting the mainte-
nance of a well-trained NASA presence on the work floor; and the difficulty of a
continued cooperative search for the most meaningful measures of operations and
processing effectiveness.
Recommendation #1a
Both NASA and the Space Flight O_rations Contract's (SFOC's) contractor,
United Space Alliance (USA), should reaffirm at frequent intervals the dedication
to safety before schedule before cost.
Response
The Space Shuttle Program concurs with the ASAP affirmation that safety is our first
priority. The potential for safety impacts _s a result of restructuring and downsizing
are recognized by NASA at every level. From the Administrator down there is the
communication of and the commitment to the policy that safety is the most impor-
tant factor to be considered in our execu1:ion of the program and that restructuring
and downsizing efforts are to recognize ths policy and solicit and support a zero tol-
erance position for safety impacts. The r_structuring efforts across the Program in
pursuit of efficiencies which might allow downsizing of the workforce consistently
stress that such efficiencies must be enabh d by identification and implementation of
better ways to accomplish the necessary gork, or the unanimous agreement that the
work is no longer necessary, but that in ether case that the safety of the operations
are preserved.
In the case of the restructuring and dowr.sizing enabled by the SFOC transition of
some responsibility and tasks to the c_mtractor, the transition plans for these
processes and tasks specifically address the safety implications of the transition.
Additionally, the Program has required the NASA Safety and Mission Assurance
(S&MA) organizations to review and concur on the transition plans as an added
assurance. Other Program downsizing efforts have similar emphasis embedded in the
definition and implementation of their restructuring, and the S&MA organizations
are similarly committed as a normal function of their institutional and programmatic
oversight to assure this focus is not compromised.
Additionally, the Program priorities of 1) fly safely, 2) meet the manifest, 3) improve
mission supportability, and 4) reduce cost are incorporated into almost every facet of
planning and communication within both the NASA and contractor execution of
the Program. Besides the continuous presentation of these priorities in employee
awareness media, the Program highlights their relative order in the formal consider-
ation of design and/or process changes being considered by the various Program
control boards. Additionally, these priorities are the focus point for most of the
Program management forums such as the Program Management Reviews and SFOC
Contract Management Reviews (CMR's). They are specified as the basis for the
Program Strategic Plan, as well as the SFOC goals and objectives used by the con-
tractor and NASA to manage and monitor the success of the SFOC. Finally, these
priorities are embedded in the SFOC award fee process (which provides for four
formal reviews each year). Specifically, the award fee criteria provide for both safety
and overall performance gates which, if not met by the contractor, would result in
loss of any potential cost reduction share by the contractor.
In summary, NASA and all of the contractors supporting the Space Shuttle Program
have always been and remain committed to assuring that safety is of the highest pri-
ority in every facet of the Program operation. While downsizing does increase the
challenge of management to execute a successful Program, process changes, design
modifications, employee skills maintenance, and reorganizations are all part of the
management challenges to be faced and resolved, and maintenance of the high level
of attention to safety in resolving these challenges is recognized by NASA and the
contractors alike as not being subject to compromise.
Recommendation #1b
NASA should develop and promulgate training and career paths leading to qualifi-
cation for senior NASA Space Shuttle management positions.
Response
While it is true that the roles for NASA management and technical personnel are
being reduced in number and reshaped to focus on the critical areas of anomalies and
changes, these roles and the ongoing role of assessing the contractor's performance
against the contract and Program requirements should provide a continued source of
trained and capable future NASA senior managers. NASA has an active commit-
ment to development of the skills for senior managers for all functional areas of the
Agency, and Space Shuttle Program senior managers are generally products of both
their in-line experiences as well as these career development programs. It is antici-
pated at this time that the roles for NASA personnel and the career development
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programs which have served NASA well to this point will be sufficient to assure a
continuation of highly qualified and caplble senior managers in the future. Given
the nature of the still evolving definition of the NASA and prime contractor roles
and responsibilities for the SFOC operati, mal model, it is reasonable to provide spe-
cial attention to this concern, and the Program will ensure that specific
consideration is given to this concern in the transition plans being developed and
implemented by the functional and instit ltional organizations across the Program.
Recommendation #1c
NASA should continue to ensure that a :rained and qualified Government person-
nel presence is maintained on the work flaor.
Response
NASA/KSC has maintained a physical p-esence on the work floor since the begin-
ning of the Shuttle Processing Contract and will continue this presence for SFOC,
Payload Ground Operations Contract, ard Base Operations Contract. NASA engi-
neering, operations, safety, and quality pvrsonnel maintain a surveillance and audit
presence of overall operations for insigl, t purposes and are formally involved for
selected tasks being performed. Presence _>n the floor monitoring hazardous or safety
critical operations has been maintained ttLrough the transition to performance based
contracting and will be maintained in tLe future. The frequency and depth of the
insight and presence may be adjusted as ju _tified by the results of the contractor's per-
formance, but the value of these checks and balances has long been recognized by
NASA and will be maintained. To a les.'er degree, this same floor presence is exe-
cuted at production sites through Resident Office presence and periodic audit and
surveillance activities by NASA Center personnel.
While there is a focused initiative to mi _imize Government mandatory inspection
points (GMIP's) across the Program, it i., mutually recognized by NASA and USA
that the criticality of some checks and kalances in critical processes demands that
some small percentage (10-15 percent) "rill be maintained on the production and
processing floors. This presence also supports the desired training and qualification
needs for NASA to remain a smart customer. Finally, there are functional roles antic-
ipated for continued NASA participatior, such as flight controllers, astronauts, and
launch directors which will also provide : significant avenue for NASA skills main-
tenance in the long-term management m)del.
Recommendation #1d
NASA and USA should continue to sear :h for, develop, test, and establish the most
meaningful measures of operations and pl ocessing effectiveness possible.
Response
Both NASA and USA recognize the value of meaningful measures of the operational
and processing effectiveness for the Program and continually strive to evolve and
improve on the measures currently in plaice. The SFOC Performance Measurement
System(PMS)hasbeenasignificantdevelopmentprojectsincethebeginningofthe
contract,continuesto takeshapeastheprimaryrepositoryfortheperformancemet-
ricswhichprovidemanagementi sightinto thecost,andtechnicalperformance
acrossthecompletecontract.Oncethesystemiscompleteandpopulatedwithviable
metrics,NASAwill validatethesystem.Thegoalis tocompletethevalidationby
thefallof 1998.KeymetricsarereviewedquarterlyattheSFOCCMR,andindivid-
ualfunctionalareasuchasflightoperationsandgroundprocessingusetheseona
continualbasisfortheirmanagementexecutionandinsight.Additionalmeasuresare
continuallydevelopedattheProgramlevelandwithinindividualfunctionalareasto
enhancetheunderstandingofperformancetrends,andwhenproventobeeffective
managementtools,thesemetricsroll intothePMSand/orotherforumsandproducts
usedto managetheProgram.
Finding #2
The Kennedy Space Center (KSC) has been successfully phasing in the structured
surveillance process for safety and quality for some time. The development of metrics
using structured surveillance information has lagged data collection.
Recommendation #2
KSC should continue to expand the use of structured surveillance and to focus effort
on the development of valid and reliable metrics to assess program performance from
structured surveillance results.
Response
We concur. The development of reliable metrics with which to measure performance
of the SFOC in all areas including safety and quality is progressing at KSC. There are
several examples of this.
At KSC, NASA Safety has developed a data base for the Space Shuttle Program,
revised its surveillance approach, and developed a method by which proper mea-
surements can be evaluated and analyzed in determining safety program management
effectiveness and contractual statement of work compliance. These new metrics will
enable NASA Safety to more effectively measure contractor performance.
The Quality Surveillance Record data base is currently being modified to clarify the
method by which deficiencies and observations are counted and to better define fail-
ure codes and other data collected. These changes will increase the reliability of the
data used to assess program performance and will be implemented in early July. In the
interim, the existing data base has been modified and focuses on surveillance data
collection for tasks which GMIP's were deleted through the GMIP reduction efforts.
KSC has developed an expanded surveillance system that will provide extensive
insight into the contractor's overall operation by process analysis. The process analy-
sis program was initiated in October 1997, and there are presently 11 Quality Process
Analysts working the pilot program at KSC. This system will provide added insight
into the contractor's processes, procedures, and policies.
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Finding #3
NASA Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) auditors at KSC overseeing opera-
tions requiring Self-Contained Atmospht.ric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) are not
certified for SCAPE.
Recommendation #3
In order to be in a position to conduct valid safety and quality audits of SCAPE
operations, NASA should ensure that pelsonnel involved are certified so that, when
necessary, they can observe the tasks whie they are performed.
Response
The Space Shuttle Program concurs that safety and quality audits of SCAPE opera-
tions be performed. However, KSC's p_sition is that NASA's safety and quality
personnel monitoring SCAPE tasks will not be exposed to the additional risk of
SCAPE operations as personnel can accomplish monitoring tasks by observing and
communicating through the audio and video capabilities of the Operational
Intercommunication System and operational television (OTV). All SCAPE tasks are
conducted on recorded communications channels that are monitored in the control
room, and the majority of tasks are obselvable on the OTV system. NASA quality
and safety personnel have performed th )se audits for several years without being
SCAPE certified.
Finding #4
To compensate for skills deficiencies re:ated to staff departures from KSC, both
NASA and USA are making extensive use of cross-training of personnel, both tech-
nicians and engineers. Individuals who _ave been cross-trained also should have
recent "hands-on" experience before the,/undertake a cross-trained task.
Recommendation #4
NASA and USA should develop and use valid and reliable measures of the readiness
of personnel to take on tasks for which the i have been trained but on which they have
only limited or episodic experience. The cross-training program could include a regu-
larly scheduled rotation of duties so that the multiply trained individual has the
opportunity to employ all of the acquired s_:ills and knowledge at appropriate intervals.
Response
NASA is in full agreement with the Pane's position that individuals who have been
cross-trained also should have recent hat ds-on experience before performing tasks.
The combined NASA/USA training an:l certification plan identifies those skills
that require hands-on training as part of t'qe certification process. Personnel selected
for cross-training are required to be certified to perform other jobs in the same
family of skills (i.e., mechanical systems, _vionics systems, electrical distribution sys-
tems). With this knowledge base, those identified for cross-training will be required
to meet the same training and performav.ce requirements established for the given
task. Performance is measured to verify that the individual has obtained the stated
objectives of the instructional tool being used. In the case of hands-on training, the
employee is required to demonstrate 100% command of the task being performed.
The certification process is controlled by the KSC Certification Board, which oper-
ates under approved certification procedures. The Certification Board, chaired
by the USA S&MA Director at KSC, approves and implements certification/re-
certification requirements.
Finding #5
The reduction of Government Mandatory Inspection Points (GMIPs) at KSC has
significantly lagged the downsizing of NASA quality personnel responsible for pro-
cessing these GMIPs. This has resulted in an expanded workload among remaining
NASA quality inspectors and made it more difficult to conduct analyses needed to
identify further GMIP reductions. There has been a similar reduction of NASA
safety inspectors and engineers at KSC without a commensurate reduction in over-
sight requirements while, at the same time, the addition of new safety audit or insight
responsibilities has taken place.
Recommendation #5
Any downsizing of personnel by both NASA and USA should be preceded by the
reduction of commensurate workload associated with Space Shuttle processing, such
as reduction of GMIPs and NASA safety inspections.
Response
NASA concurs with the recommended approach of reducing the workload in Space
Shuttle processing before proceeding with downsizing NASA and USA personnel;
however, we have not been as successful in this area as desired. In the downsizing
effort implemented in February 1998, USA experienced an unexpectedly high level
of voluntary attrition in certain critical functions--an outcome that was predicted
by ASAP members and others. Although USA experienced shortages of critical
skills and staffing to minimum levels for short periods of time in selected areas,
USA and NASA worked together to overcome these deficits and assure that the
scheduled missions through STS-91 were safely executed. This was done by a com-
bination of launch schedule relief, back-filling USA shortages with NASA
expertise, and re-hiring technical expertise to train and certify USA staff, thus
eliminating shortages in critical skills. Evaluation of GMIPs for potential elimina-
tion by process engineering and quality engineering staff continues. It is estimated
that approximately 6,000 of the original 22,000 GMIPs will remain in place at the
end of this effort. This is a level assessed as commensurate with the current NASA
quality inspection workforce.
NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) continues to
evaluate the situation at KSC regarding NASA and USA workforce reductions by
assessing process efficiencies and workload indicators. Indicators of process effective-
ness include overtime rates and first-time quality rates. Although the efforts are not
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NASA quality inspections will drop. Additionally, if the development of process effi-
ciency initiatives by USA are effective, th,-'n, when implemented, OSMA anticipates
that USA engineering and technician ow rtime rates will drop and first-time quality
rates, based on NASA surveillance sampl ng, will increase.
EXTERNAL TANK (ET)
Finding #6
The Super Light Weight Tank (SLWT) has completed its design certification review,
and proof tests on the first tank have been satisfactorily passed. The only remaining
test to complete certification on the SLWT is the cryogenic loading test that will be
run on the first production tank on the launch pad. The diligent attention that has
been given to quality control, particularly to material inspection and weld integrity,
has made this program successful.
Recommendation #6
NASA should ensure that the current manufacturing and quality control procedures
continue to be rigidly adhered to and conscientiously followed in production.
Response
NASA concurs with this recommendation. MSFC and Lockheed Martin Michoud Space
Systems (LMMSS), the External Tank prime contractor, periodically perform a NASA
Engineering and Quality Audit (NEQA) which focuses on both the processes and the
flight hardware. The audit is conducted by experienced MSFC and LMMSS technical
and management personnel and the operators and inspectors that actually utilize those
processes. LMMSS also performs internal and supplier audits throughout the year. In
addition, on-site MSFC Science and Engineering, Safety and Mission Assurance, and
DCMC personnel provide continuous insight and guidance through surveillance and
limited oversight activities. Finally, adherence to manufacturing and quality control pro-
cedures is one of the primary focuses of the on-site government personnel.
Finding #7
The design requirements for the SLWT include operating with a maximum Space
Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) power of only 106%, even at abort conditions. The
Space Shuttle program has approved a baseline plan to examine the possibility of cer-
tifying the Space Shuttle for intact aborts at a 109% SSME power setting.
Recommendation #7
NASA should complete its evaluation of a 109% power setting for intact aborts as
soon as practicable and reevaluate the ability of the SLWT to accommodate this
higher power setting.
Response
NASA concurs with the ASAP recommendation. Specific evaluations with regards
to orbiter and SLWT have already been completed or are near completion. The
Block II Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) certification program will provide the
capability for intact abort at 109 percent power level. This certification program is
planned to be complete by October 1, 1998. A change request to baseline the
109 percent intact abort loads and thermal environments shall be released by the end
of 1998 following completion of Block I1 SSME 109 percent certification.
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Finding #8
Obsolescence changes to the RSRM processes, materials, and hardware are continu-
ous because of changing regulations and cther issues impacting RSRM suppliers. It is
extremely prudent to qualify all changes n timely, large-scale Flight Support Motor
(FSM) firings prior to produce/ship/fly. N. kSA has recently reverted from its planned
12-month FSM firing interval to tests on 18-month intervals.
Recommendation #8
Potential safety risks outweigh the small amount of money that might be saved by
scheduling the FSM motor tests at 18-month intervals rather than 12 months.
NASA should realistically reassess the test intervals for FSM static test firings to
ensure that they are sufficiently frequent :oqualify, prior to motor flight, the contin-
uing large number of materials, process, and hardware changes.
Response
Evaluation of all known reusable solid rocket motor (RSRM) future material,
process, and hardware changes (by NASA and Thiokol) has confirmed no safety risk
impact resulting from FSM static tests ev._ry 18 months, in lieu of every 12 months.
The RSRM Project goal to "include all c Ranges in a static test prior to flight incor-
poration" has not changed, and any exce 3tions will continue to be approved by the
Space Shuttle Program Manager before f ight incorporation. If a change is planned
in the future wherein an 18-month FSM static test frequency is insufficient to sup-
port qualification prior to motor fligh::, program funding requirements will be
considered to accelerate an FSM static est to ensure no increased program flight
safety risk.
LOGISTICS
Finding #9
Support of the Space Shuttle fleet with operational spares has been maintained by
the effective efforts of the logistics function. While spares support has been adequate
for the current flight rate, any increase in flight rate might not be supportable.
Recommendation #9
Although NASA has established programs for dealing with suppliers and bringing
additional component overhaul "in house," efforts in these areas need to be contin-
uously reexamined to speed up the restoration and upgrading of line-replaceable
units. Such efforts are especially needed to eliminate "dead" time while units are
awaiting restoration.
Response
The Space Shuttle Program concurs with the ASAP concerns for the availability of
line replaceable units (LRU's). Logistics monitors LRU spares posture through the
probability of sufficiency calculations within the LRU data system. This system can
be programmed to determine spares requirements for various flight rates. At this
time, an appreciable increase in flight rate would be required to jeopardize support-
ing the Space Shuttle Program with most of the current LRU's.
The Program has been proactive in upgrading LRU's where the most pressing fleet
support concerns exist. The following upgrades are in progress:
1. The air data transducer assembly is being replaced by the advanced air data
transducers.
2. The master events controller is being replaced by the advanced master events
controller.
3. The Global Positioning System is being installed in the orbiters at the orbiter
major modification. This could potentially eliminate a number of LRU's in the
displays and controls system and tactical air navigation system.
4. New shop replaceable units were purchased to repair the Microwave Scanning
Beam Land Station decoders. This decreases turnaround time and increases
reliability of the units.
5. Solid state recorders are being considered as replacements for the operations
and payload recorders. This effort is presently in the design definition phase.
Additionally, through the use of industrial engineering principles and work teams,
Logistics has taken action to reduce the NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot (NSLD)
backlog and increase output for fiscal year 1998. To date, backlog has decreased 8 per-
cent since October 1 by increasing output. These efforts are aimed at providing better
support at the current flight rate but are also the type of efforts that will allow higher
flight rates in the future.
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Transition and development of the logisti ;s tasks for the orbiter and its ground oper-
ations under the SFOC are proceeding ef:iciently and according to plan.
Recommendation #10
NASA and USA should continue the t,sk of management integration of the for-
merly separate logistics contracts and retain and expand the roles of the experienced
logistics specialists therein.
Response
The Space Shuttle Program concurs with the ASAP philosophy of logistics integra-
tion. Integrated Logistics has been succ_ ssful in integrating Ground Logistics and
more recently, Flight Operations Logistics with Orbiter Logistics insight. As new ele-
ments are integrated within USA, the sharing of new techniques and best in class
practices is occurring. Logistics is recogni2ed as a key member of both the NASA and
contractor teams; their input is actively sought on key decisions, and they are mem-
bers of key decision-making boards and pmels.
Finding #11
As reported last year, long-term projectic ns are still suggesting increasing cannibal-
ization rates, increasing component regair turnaround times, and loss of repair
capability for the Space Shuttle logisti:s programs. If the present trend is not
arrested, support difficulties may arise in _he next 3 or 4 years.
Recommendation #11
NASA and USA should reexamine and take action to reverse the more worrying
trends highlighted by the statistical trend data.
Response
The Space Shuttle Program has recognize t the concerns for long-term supportability
and is proactively pursuing improvement s. Cannibalizations continue to be closely
monitored and are well within limits. Th__re have been several concerns during this
past year (seals and cryo heater controller; ) that are requiring the adjustment of spar-
ing levels. The Logistics organization is :_ggressively pursuing a solution to specific
problems as well as pursuing innovations :o keep the rate below the standard.
As mentioned in the response to Finding _9, the NSLD backlog is now decreasing as
a result of USA action. This should ultim Ltely reduce the repair turn around time for
hardware although short term increases ,:an be expected. Other initiatives such as
the replacement of unserviceable test equipment at vendors are also in progress.
Logistics and Engineering are developing :ommon tools to integrate upgrade actions,
resolve supportability issues, and mitigat_ the loss of repair capability. The Problem
Resolution Teams have increased the interfaces with Logistics, Engineering, and
management to ensure a proactive and in'_egrated effort in identifying problem areas
and identifying solutions. Numerous initi roves are under way.
Finally, NASA has funded through Space Shuttle upgrades the prototyping of a new
expert logistics system which shows promise in ranking issues according to severity.
This data might then be used to assure that limited funding available is used as eco-
nomically and wisely as possible in order to minimize risk in the most vulnerable areas.
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Finding # 12
Node #1 was shipped to KSC before comph tion, and it is planned or anticipated that
other 1SS hardware will be shipped before _ualification tests are completed. This dis-
rupts the desirable continuity of effort and can lead to safety problems.
Recommendation #12
NASA should assure that ISS assemblies sLipped before completion of the manufac-
turing, testing, and qualification processes have been carefully scrutinized to make
sure that no safety-related steps are subverted.
Response
The generation, implementation and trac<ing of LSS assembly, checkout and test
requirements is provided by engineering, c mfiguration management and safety and
mission assurance processes that are in plat e and actively monitored. Should a deci-
sion be made to transfer flight articles t() a different location for completion of
planned assembly and checkout activities, these processes ensure an accurate status
of accomplished and traveled work is kno_cn and documented. In addition, a pre-
determined set of criteria identifies the set of minimum essential requirements to be
accomplished prior to shipment.
All ISS assemblies undergo a rigorous pred elivery review prior to shipment to KSC.
This high-level review is attended by Seni Jr NASA and contractor representatives
from all the major functional disciplines iJ_volved in the specific assembly in ques-
tion, including Engineering, Quality, Safer I, Hardware Integration Office, and KSC
Processing. Open work items that are candidates for completion at KSC are specifi-
cally addressed, validated and accepted by all in attendance prior to being forwarded
for integration into the contractors existing work plan for KSC.
No work practices or safety related practice ; are compromised by this process. Boeing
remains completely accountable for work :ompletion and providing complete and
fully tested ISS components to NASA r(gardless of the physical location of the
assembly process.
Finding #13
The ISS Phase I Shuttle-Mir program has reaffirmed what was learned on Skylab:
that a manned space station can be surpr singly resilient in emergency situations.
Much has been learned from the operatior s on Mir to date and much more may be
learned from continued analysis of joint ol:erations on Mir.
Recommendation #13
The ISS team should continue to examir e the Shuttle-Mir program carefully for
examples from which ISS operations can I:enefit and to provide policies and proce-
dures to implement effective action should similar events occur on the ISS. The
effort should be expanded beyond Mir to focus as well on possible weaknesses in the
ISS design and operations. ISS should assemble a special team including, persons
with system-level perspectives as well as with design, operations, and human factors
experience, to address these issues.
Response
The ISS Program (ISSP) has benefited greatly from the Phase I Program experiences
in the areas of operational feasibility and validation, procedures development and
logistics manifesting, and in some cases, hardware modifications.
A more rigorous process for evaluating Shuttle/Mir lessons learned has been imple-
mented and will assure that ISS realizes maximum benefit from Shuttle/Mir lessons
learned. Phase I management screens and prioritizes lessons learned from each
Shuttle/Mir flight increment to document significant and applicable lessons to ISS.
These lessons are thoroughly reviewed by ISS Lessons Learned Screening Panel. For
each lesson, actionee(s) are assigned to analyze ISS applicability and possible imple-
mentation or rationale for nonimplementation. The Lessons Learned Screening
Panel and ISSP management will assure that the proposed implementation is appro-
priate. This screening process includes representatives from numerous organizations
to ensure that all these issues are adequately addressed. This same process is used to
incorporate lessons learned which are discovered within the ISS Program as well.
(Note: Process is depicted in the accompanying figure.)
• Identify Significant Lessons from Phase I
- Each Phase I working group to identify key lessons
- Eliminate duplication and focus on high impact lessons
• Front End Analysis
- Determine root causes and add appropriate level of detail
• Screen Lessons
- ISS Lessons Learned Screening Panel has been established to prioritize
and categorize lessons
- Determine responsible person/organization to respond
• Document and Track
- Enter lessons into database and track disposition
• Decompose, Analyze, and Disposition Lessons
- Systems Engineering used to determine applicability and impacts
- Disposition: implement, partially implement, or no practical implementation
Another specific example of Phase I lessons learned implementation: Unplanned
events on Mir resulted in the requirement to provide late stowage of items on the
Shuttle. The requirement to support this activity has reinforced the importance of
building flexibility into our ground processing capabilities and operational planning
for the ISS Phase 2 resupply missions. In order to accommodate the potential for
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similar requirements during Phase 2, we have designed and are in the process of
developing support equipment which will permit contingency access to the Multi-
Purpose Logistics Module (MPLM) after it is installed in the orbiter at the Pad. This
will enhance our ability to react to change:; which require the addition of items late
in the processing flow.
The Manager, Phase 1 Program, has been di .'ected by the Lead Center director to per-
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display development, audio interfaces, fli;ht rules/procedures, and IP development
areas. The C&W review resulted in a tot al of 35 issues requiring resolution. These
issues ranged from editorial comments ag;dnst the C&W Description Document to
the identification of Russian audio interfa,ze concerns, Japanese Experiment Module
C&W Panel Latencies, requirements trodifications, and needed display design
changes. The finalized C&W system reqliirements are documented and controlled
within the formal ISS configuration managed specification hierarchy, and any mod-
ification, waiver, or deviation requires offi zial Program direction.
The CWSIT, which has oversight and ext.'nsive involvement with the class 1/emer-
gency procedures, has developed and retains ownership of the classification
guidelines requirements, and maintains control of these requirements through the
C&W Working Group. The actual procedure development is assigned to the Mission
Operations Directorate (MOD), who is responsible for the particular system, under
the direction of the MOD management an| Joint Operations Panel. The CWSIT has
briefed the development organizations on the general philosophy of the class 1/2/3
procedures required for C&W. In addition, the CWSIT reviews all changes to the
class 2/3 procedures after they are placed tnder configuration control.
The integration of C&W event response procedures is ensured across the program by
the CWSIT and its constituent MOD, Crew Office, and program sub-system repre-
sentatives. The situation response and dan age control procedures are included in the
baselined and configuration managed ISS Mission Rules and Procedures. These flight
procedures are integrated into the overall iisplay development and design modifica-
tion processes currently in work.
The Boeing developed Matrix-X C&W s mulator has been brought on-line and is
providing simulation support to the progr;im as well as providing a data driven dis-
play assessment environment. This simu ator has already provided much needed
integration support to requirements and design development and is now geared
towards supporting procedure developme:_t and crew training. The simulator has
been instrumental in the performance of ntegrated crew reviews of both flight 2A
procedures and display architectures. The use of this simulator in conjunction with
the Flight Crew Training Division's Part "1-_skTrainers has contributed to the devel-
opment of an integrated, productive, and .'afe C&W system.
C. COMPUTERHARDWARE/SOFTWARE
Finding # 16
The ISS software development schedule is almost impossibly tight. If something else
does not cause a further delay in ISS deployment, software development may very
well do so. The decision this year to add integrated testing of some modules at KSC
is a very positive step for safety. However, there is no room in the schedule for
required changes that may be discovered during this testing.
Recommendation #16
NASA should realistically reevaluate the achievable ISS software development and
test schedule and be willing to delay the ISS deployment if necessary rather than
potentially sacrificing safety.
Response
The Program has established an aggressive activity to integrate developer schedules with
need dates (including training as well as test). Schedules are difficult but proving to be
achievable. Any disconnect, whether it is schedule or content, is tracked and worked
through the Program's formal decision process on a daily basis. Staffing is reviewed weekly
and will be sustained to meet commitments. Additional independent verification and
validation and software assurance support has been added. The program is firmly com-
mitted to our test plans and will make the appropriate schedule adjustments to maintain
these plans. The recently approved Revision D to the ISS assembly sequence provides
additional schedule flexibility to accomplish all testing and software activities. Finally, the
program will not commit to flight until the software has been adequately tested.
Finding # 17
NASA does not yet have adequate plans for the long-term maintenance of the soft-
ware development tools being used to produce the 1SS software.
Recmmnendat/on # 17
NASA should recognize the importance of maintaining its software development
tools, plan now for how these are to be maintained over a period of decades, and pro-
vide adequate funding to support this activity.
Response
Provision for support of software development tools is provided in the ISS Sustaining
Engineering Plan. Funding is also provided to maintain Ada compiler license and soft-
ware support. This includes a clause requiring delivery of source code in the event of a
provider decision not to support the compiler users at a later date. The GFE software is
maintained by inter-organizational Technical Task Agreements (TTA's) which will be
managed by the same Sustaining Engineering organization that is responsible for all ISS
integrated software maintenance's and upgrades. Activity is also underway to investi-
gate the impact of upgrading the Ada compiler to a more current design or even to
consider moving away from Ada to other widely universally supported languages, as a
part of the ISS Pre-planned Production Improvement activity.
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Finding # 18
The computer system being developed for :he 1SS is already at a point where NASA
should begin planning for upgrading it. The ISS program presently has no plans for
upgrading the ISS computer system.
Recommendation #18
NASA should upgrade the computer systrm as soon as possible and coordinate the
upgrade with its solution to the long-term development tool maintenance problem.
Response
The Program's computer system must be v.ewed in two parts: 1) the core infrastruc-
ture; i.e. multiplexers/demultiplexers (MDid's) and 2) the user interface; i.e. Portable
Computer System. The core infrastructur,.' maintains the facility environment and
basic command and control interface. 'Fhis functionality will require minimal
growth, but obviously must be capable of being maintained over the period of ISS
life. The user interface, on the other hanJ, must be capable of growth to enhance
productivity as well as be maintainable. With this in mind, the user interface is
developed using commercially available hr rdware and software and will be upgraded
as technology progresses. In fact, one upgl ade is already being implemented at 5A.
Provisions for maintenance of the comput_ r system is provided in the lSS Sustaining
Engineering Plan. Funding is provided to n aintain critical skills to support flight and
ground hardware, including support engint ering and touch labor to repair cards and
provide new spares; this includes maintain.ng critical facilities. An ISS Pre-Planned
Program Improvement (P3I) study is undel review to evaluate a more current design
upgrade to the MDM "386" processor in FY 99, to ensure MDM core infrastructure
sustainability and adequate growth potent al during the 1SS lifetime. In addition a
technical new start for an enhanced mass ;torage device for the MDM is also under
review to improve reliability and storage c:Lpability.
Finding # 19
The Checkout and Launch Control Systela (CLCS) program at KSC has not been
provided with funding for Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) that is
safety critical for a software effort of this si e.
Recommendation #19
The Checkout and Launch Control Syste:n (CLCS) should be provided with ade-
quate funding for software IV&V.
Response
KSC concurs with the ASAP recommen¢ ation relative to IV&V funding for the
CLCS Project. A Memorandum of Agreen ent (MOA) was signed on May 5, 1998,
between the Software IV&V Facility and _SC, for the performance application of
IV&V techniques and methods to the CLCS software. The scope of this memoran-
dum will include performing 1V&V on sele:ted catastrophic/critical/high risk CLCS
software components. The selected softwar_ components will consist of CLCS system
software.Thespecificareastobeanalyzedwillbesystemredundancy,commandsup-
port,datadistributionandprocessing,constraintmanagement,andthesatingsystem
relatedsoftware.The softwarerelatedto satingincludesthe EmergencySating
Systemandthosecontrollogicmodulesassociatedwithsating(someofwhichmay
residewithinapplicationsoftware).Theanalysiswillconsistofrequirements,design,
code,andtestanalysis,asapplicableforthelifecycleofthesoftwarebeinganalyzed.
Theapplicationi terfaceswiththesystemsoftwarewillalsobeanalyzed.Inaddition,
theIV&V Facilitywill performsystemlevelanalysisof thesystemtestplanand
systemtestsperformedalongwithsoftwarengineeringandintegrationanalysisof
theCLCSsystemasawhole.
ThisMOAiseffectivefromMay1,1998,untilSeptember30,2000.Theworkiden-
tified in thisMOA will requirea staffinglevelof about16full timeequivalents
(FTE's).Thisstaffinglevelwill becomprisedof 15FTE'sfromtheIV&V contractor
locatedattheIV&V FacilityandatKSC.TheremainingoneFTEwillbeacivilser-
vicepersonnel.StaffingatKSCwill becomprisedofeightcontractorFTE'swiththe
remainderresidingattheFairmontFacility.
TheSpaceShuttleProgramhasagreedto fundthiseffortat$4.5Moverthe lifeof
theMOA.
ANNUAL REPORT
FOR 1998

AppendixC
AEROSPACESAFETYADVISORYPANELACTIVITIES
JANUARY-I)ECDVIBER1998
JANUARY
7 Kennedy Space Center, STS-89 Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
FEBRUARY
11-12 Headquarters, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Annual Meeting
19-20 Lockheed Martin "Skunk Works," Review of the X-33 Program
25 Pratt and Whitney and Kennedy Space Center, KSC/SFOC Team Visit
MARCH
17-19 Kennedy Space Center, KSC/SFOC Team Visit
23 Johnson Space Center, International Space Station Task Force Meeting
APRIL
1-2 Kennedy Space Center, SFOC Contract Discussions and STS-90 Flight
Readiness Review
8-9 Ames Research Center, Aeronautics Team Visit
19-21 Kennedy Space Center, ITV Meeting
MAY
4-5
12-14
19
21-22
Kennedy Space Center, Human Factors Workshop
Johnson Space Center, Plenary Session
Kennedy Space Center, Attend STS-91 FRR
Orbital Sciences Corporation, X-34 Meeting
JUNE
12
16-18
23
Johnson Space Center, United Space Alliance Advisory Board Meeting
OEA, Colorado Electric, Ball Aerospace, and Lockheed Martin, Space
Shuttle Vendor Visits
Ogden, Utah, Space Shuttle Program Manager's Review
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84
JULY
8
15-16
22-23
29
Dryden Flight Research Center, Attend LASRE FRR
Kennedy Space Center, Super S _fety Day and Meeting with United Space
Alliance
Johnson Space Center, Comput .'r Team Visit
Arlington, Virginia, United Space Alliance Advisory Board Meeting
AUGUST
4 Langley Research Center, Aerol tautics Team Visit
18-19 Kennedy Space Center, KSC Team Visit
26-27 Marshall Space Flight Center, Pienary Session
27 Seattle, Washington, John McEonald Accepted the Jack Williams Space
Logistics Medal
SEPTEMBER
10-11 Johnson Space Center, EVA Tel m Visit
OCTOBER
6-7
9
13
14
14-15
23
26
27
Canoga Park, California, Space _huttle Program Manager's Review
Lewis Research Center, Attend 'Turning Goals Into Reality" Conference
Kennedy Space Center, STS-95 FRR
Headquarters, Workforce Issues/Fact-Finding Meeting
Dryden Flight Research Center, Aeronautics Team Visit
Johnson Space Center, ISS Prog ram Readiness Review
Headquarters, Attend AA for CSMA Briefing to Mr. Goldin
Kennedy Space Center, STS-95 L.1 and Launch
NOVEMBER
4 Independent Verification and V tlidation Facility, Fairmont, West Virginia,
4-5
12-13
16
17-18
23-24
Computer Team Visit
Kennedy Space Center, Attend [ntegrated Logistics Panel Meeting
Headquarters, Plenary Session
Kennedy Space Center, Compuler Team Visit
Ames Research Center, Aeronmttics Team Visit
Kennedy Space Center, STS-88 FRR
DECEMBER
1-2
8
17
Headquarters, Editorial Commit:ee Meeting
Los Angeles, California, Thiokot Propulsion Supplier Briefing
Headquarters, Editorial Commit :ee Meeting
